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FORUM-SELECTION PROVISIONS IN CORPORATE
“CONTRACTS”
Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan*

Abstract: We consider the emergent practice of including clauses in corporate certificates
of incorporation or bylaws that specify an exclusive judicial forum for lawsuits. According to
their proponents and most courts that have considered the question, such forum-terms are, and
should be, enforceable as contractual choice-of-forum provisions.
We argue that treating corporate charter and bylaw forum-terms as a matter of ordinary
contract doctrine is neither logical nor justified. Because charters and bylaws involve the state
in ways that are at odds with private-ordering principles and because they entail only a limited
form of “consent,” an analysis of enforceability must account for the hybrid nature—public
and private—of such terms. Specifically, the state’s role should render forum-terms invalid
that oust federal courts of diversity jurisdiction. Likewise, because of a lack of any meaningful
consent, a forum-term that applies to a claim that is neither derivative nor brought by a
shareholder should not be enforced. In other situations, courts should consider, before
enforcing a corporate forum-term, whether adjudicating the entire dispute in the designated
forum would be efficient (e.g., whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over all
claims) or fair (e.g., whether the procedural rules, including the limitations period, of the
designated forum are substantially more advantageous to the parties who decided to adopt the
forum-term than those of the state that supplies the substantive law). In some cases, efficiency
and fairness factors will argue against the forum-term’s enforcement.
On the other hand, several factors in other corporate settings and, in particular, in mergerrelated representative suits, may tip the balance towards enforcement. First, the fact that
“consent” by class members to these suits is also limited counter-balances concerns about the
limited consent shareholders may have given to the forum-term. Second, a forum-term reduces
the ability to avoid the crack-down on “disclosure-only” settlements—that provide broad
releases, but entail minimal recovery—that Delaware courts have embarked on.
Finally, we consider the implications of corporate forum-terms to debates about interstate
competition for incorporation and for corporate litigation. A state may adopt forum-term
legislation to enhance its attractiveness as a corporate domicile or to protect shareholders in
domestic corporations. However, legislation that discriminates against out-of-state courts and
seeks to centralize corporate litigation in the state’s own courts for the benefit of its local bar
may be vulnerable to non-enforcement in the courts of sister states.
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INTRODUCTION
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “Whether you can make
words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said
Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”1
What is a corporation, and why does it matter? A century ago, the U.S.
Supreme Court treated the corporation as a creature of the state, making
it subject to any condition that a state chose to impose.2 “The only rights”
a corporation could claim, Justice Taney explained in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 3 “are the rights which are given to it” in the corporation’s charter,
and “not the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a state.”4
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 205 (1934).
2. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK.
L. REV. 767, 768 (1989) (describing the theory).
3. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
4. Id. at 587.
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The Court eventually retreated from this view, granting the corporation
procedural rights against the federal and state governments under the Due
Process Clause,5 and later according it protection for speech otherwise
within the scope of the First Amendment.6 Despite this doctrinal shift, the
Court saw no contradiction in rejecting a challenge under the Commerce
Clause to anti-takeover legislation, relying upon the earlier conception of
the corporation as a creature of the state.7
On a separate track, finance scholars cast the corporation as a contract
or as a nexus of contracts.8 Within the corporation-as-contract model,
corporate law—and especially the corporate law of Delaware, as the state
with the premier corporate law in the United States—is said to function
as an enabler of corporate choice, free of public regulation.9 Not
surprisingly, the existing legal landscape has been criticized as incoherent
and inconsistent.10
Nevertheless, what is clear is that how courts characterize the
corporation significantly affects legal doctrines that impact not only the
corporation, but also third parties such as shareholders, vendors, and
political candidates. The characterization question is important even for
the most technical sounding rules of corporate practice. In this Article, we
consider an emergent practice—including a clause in a corporation’s
charter or bylaws that specifies and so limits where lawsuits may be
filed—as a window into larger issues of state power and private ordering.
So far, state courts and lower federal courts that have considered the
question have applied a contractual approach to determining whether
5. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) (noting that it is well-established
that the corporation is entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
corporation must comply with Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (“The Court has recognized that First
Amendment protection extends to corporations.”).
7. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
8. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). The nexus-of-contracts
conception of the corporation has many critics. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That
the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819
n.2 (1999) (“The conception has never lacked critics.”).
9. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416,
1426 (1989) (referring to the “voluntary adventure” of corporate investing).
10. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 785, 797 n.69 (“Supreme Court rulings have not adopted a consistent view of corporate
personhood.”). But see Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 95, 100 (2014) (“The Court adopts a consistent approach, but the approach proceeds rightby-right, rather than by starting with a theory of organizations or corporations as constitutional
actors.”).
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corporate forum-terms are valid or enforceable.11 It is old news that the
parties to a contract are allowed to do things that the state cannot. Quite
apart from specifying terms like price or quality, ordinary commercial
contracts regularly include clauses saying where the parties to the contract
can sue should a dispute arise.12 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the
validity of contractual forum-selection terms under contract principles, on
the view that it is efficient and fair to let the parties decide where and how
to litigate.13 Under the corporation-as-contract conception, permitting a
corporate charter or bylaw, the constitutive documents of a corporation,
to specify where shareholders can sue the company would seem the
logical next doctrinal step.14 Indeed, a leading corporate lawyer has called
the use of forum-terms in corporate charters and bylaws simply “another
brick in the wall” of private ordering.15
We say: not so fast. Treating corporate charter and bylaw forum-terms
as a matter of ordinary contract doctrine is neither logical nor justified.
No doubt, there is a family resemblance between a corporate charter or
bylaw and an ordinary contract.16 But a corporation’s charter and bylaws
are no ordinary contracts. Rather, they are hybrid legal structures that
provide a mechanism for collective choice in the context of substantial
state regulation and straddle the public-private divide in ways that make
them quite dissimilar from ordinary contracts. Indeed, their unusual
11. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
507 (2011) (discussing the Court’s contractual approach to forum-selection terms).
12. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1475, 1511 (2009) (reporting evidence “that choice of law and choice of forum provisions
are negotiated in the material contracts of public firms”).
13. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) (upholding validity of forumterm if “it is freely bargained for and contravenes no important public policy of the forum”); Geoffrey
P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2089 (2009)
(discussing the autonomy rationale for enforcement of forum-selection terms by New York courts).
14. See George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 609, 611 (2016) (“By
conceptualizing the corporation as a collection of negotiated agreements between the firm and
individual shareholders, proponents of ex-ante governance defend unilateral bylaw initiatives as the
permissible product of flexible private ordering.”); Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by
Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 531 (2016) (urging “expansive use” of tailored procedure for corporate
governance).
15. William Savitt, Forum-Selection Bylaws—Another Brick in the Wall, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 10, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04
/10/forum-selection-bylaws-another-brick-in-the-wall/ [https://perma.cc/UAV7-Q8DJ].
16. See Robert Borowski, Combatting Multiforum Shareholder Litigation: A Federal Acceptance
of Forum Selection Bylaws, 44 SW. L. REV. 149, 150 (2014) (“[B]ylaws are generally treated as
contracts between corporations and their shareholders.”); Henry duPont Ridgely, The Emerging Role
of Bylaws in Corporate Governance, 68 SMU L. REV. 317, 323 (2015) (“[C]orporate bylaws are
merely contractual agreements between the corporation, its directors, and the stockholders.”).
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features make applying a contractual paradigm to corporate forum-terms
vulnerable to two significant challenges.
First, corporate charters and bylaws involve a type of consent that often
is only distantly related to contract principles. Even academic proponents
of the corporation-as-contract model admit that terms added after the
purchase of the stock or at some later point are contractually suspect.17
These so-called mid-stream amendments do not bear a hallmark of
consent equivalent to ordinary contracts. The absence of consent raises
familiar questions about the fairness of compelling adherence to terms that
do not reflect agreement or preference.
Second, corporate charters and bylaws involve the state in ways that
are at odds with private-ordering principles. State judicial decisions
routinely call the state a party to the corporate “contract” of a domestic
corporation.18 But the state reserves rights that typically are not a part of
an ordinary contract—above all, the unilateral right to enact laws that
retroactively modify or render invalid aspects of the corporate-governance
structure. States, however, operate under legal constraints that do not
apply to private actors. These constraints are particularly pronounced in
the context of laws that restrict access to courts or disfavor the interests of
other states. Thus, the Constitution generally does not permit a state to
adopt a “forum-selection” statute that eliminates a party’s right to sue in
the courts of a sister state or in federal court. Should the notionally private
corporate “contract” be subject to these constraints imposed on the state
because the state is considered to be a party to the contract?19 Conversely,
should the intermediary of the “corporate contract” permit the state to
achieve indirectly goals that it could not achieve directly because of
constitutional limits on government power?
These questions have current importance. Delaware, the state in the
forefront of corporate law in the United States, amended its law in 2015
to authorize companies to adopt an exclusive forum for corporate
litigation through a charter or bylaw provision, provided that Delaware is

17. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 1442–44; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1822 (1989) (arguing the contractual view of corporation offers strong reasons
to limit mid-stream amendments).
18. Infra section II.A.
19. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison
Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1576 (2014) (considering whether the fact that the poison pill is a
private arrangement insulates it from a preemption challenge under the Williams Act, given the extent
to which state-law rules enable the practice and “are critical to the extent to which the pill empowers
incumbents to block tender offers”).
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among the selected fora.20 Corporations, in increasing numbers, have
adopted such provisions.21 The validity of such a term within Delaware,
and its enforceability in other states, go to core matters of judicial
federalism and corporate governance.
Moreover, even if corporate forum-terms can be justified, corporations
have started to use the contractual paradigm to adopt provisions that have
farther reaching effects on jurisdictional doctrine and so on the scope of
due process protections. In particular, many Delaware corporations have
begun to include shareholder deemed-consent provisions in their charters
and bylaws that postulate that a shareholder who bought stock after the
term was added shall be “deemed” to have “consented” to personal
jurisdiction in Delaware to enforce the forum-selection term if that
shareholder files an action in a different court.22 In our view, a state could
not mandate such a result, but it is a result that very quickly could become
entrenched through the reflexive—and, in our view, inappropriate—
application of the contractual approach.
Although the contractual paradigm is not a sufficient basis for the
blanket enforcement of corporate forum-terms, we recognize that, in some
situations, corporate forum-terms may be beneficial. Arguably, their
emergence in corporate practice is part of a strategy to curb abuses in
representative litigation, with the Delaware judiciary as chief designer of
that strategy. Delaware judges have commenced a crack-down on
settlements in corporate disputes that addresses the dual problem of
settlements with high attorneys’ fees and minimal recovery, coupled with
broad releases that may bar claims before they have been sufficiently
investigated.23 Centralizing intra-corporate disputes involving Delaware
corporations—as is achieved through corporate forum-terms—may be
necessary to assure that Delaware’s strategy is not undermined by other
state courts. Viewed in this light, corporate forum-terms serve to limit the
adverse effects of such litigation on both the parties and the public. These
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2017).
21. Infra note 44.
22. See, e.g., ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC., BY-LAWS OF ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC. (FORM
8-K, EX. 3.1), art. XI, at 35 (2016) (“If any action the subject matter of which is within the scope of
the preceding sentence is filed in a court other than a court located within the State of Delaware (a
“Foreign Action”) in the name of any shareowner, such shareowner will be deemed to have consented
to (x) the personal jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located within the State of Delaware in
connection with any action brought in any such court to enforce the preceding sentence and (y) having
service of process made upon such shareowner in any such action by service upon such shareowner’s
counsel in the Foreign Action as agent for such shareowner.”) [hereinafter ROCKWELL
AUTOMATION].
23. See infra text accompanying notes 173–82.
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benefits may be lost, or at the least obscured, if the validity and
enforceability of corporate forum-terms turn exclusively on the
touchstone of party consent within a contractual paradigm.
The Article is organized as follows. In Part I we briefly rehearse the
emergent practice of director-initiated forum-selection provisions in a
corporation’s charter or bylaws. Specifically, we examine the case law
and Delaware’s 2015 amendment to its incorporation law that together
regulate the validity of forum-selection terms in a corporate charter or
bylaw in Delaware corporations.24 So far, courts largely have accorded
corporate forum-terms the same presumption of validity and
enforceability given to forum-terms in ordinary contracts.
Part II examines two features of corporate forum-terms that distinguish
them from the ordinary contractual provisions that have dominated the
literature on customized procedure. These two distinguishing features are
the state’s participation in the contractual relation and the limited form of
consent given by shareholders to the forum-term. Given the state’s
unusual role in corporate charters and bylaws, we do not view the quasiassent supplied by the shareholders’ voluntary decision to invest in a
company as a sufficient ground for treating a charter or bylaw forum-term
as valid. However, we do not see the absence of full shareholder consent
as sufficient for treating the forum-term as unenforceable. Rather, we
argue that the court’s approach must account for the hybrid nature of such
terms—public and private—when they appear in a corporation’s
constitutive documents.
In Part III, we explore the implications of our analysis for adjudicative
practice, looking at questions that are important to the next stage of
discussion about corporate forum-terms. First, we argue that given the
state’s role in the corporate “contract,” certain forum-terms ought to be
invalid and unenforceable. Second, we explain why consent ought not to
be the touchstone of the validity of a corporate forum-term or of its
enforceability. Third, we show how our approach to corporate forumterms differs from current doctrine with respect to ordinary contractual
forum-terms in the context of a motion to transfer or to dismiss on the
ground of forum non conveniens.
The Conclusion moves beyond adjudicative practice and considers
corporate forum-terms in relation to broader questions of corporate
regulation, assessing their likely impact upon interstate competition for
incorporation and for corporate litigation. We argue that to the extent a
state’s motivation for adopting forum-term legislation that discriminates

24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115.
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against out-of-state courts was to benefit the local bar, the legislation
presents grounds for sister states to refuse to enforce the forum-term.
I.

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ENABLING OF BYLAW
FORUM-TERMS

Until 2010, most charters and bylaws of publicly-traded corporations
did not include any forum-terms.25 Delaware, where most companies are
incorporated, did not expressly authorize the adoption of forum-choice
provisions in these documents and commentators disagreed whether such
a provision, if adopted, would be valid.26
The use of corporate forum-terms started to gain popularity after
Delaware’s Vice-Chancellor Laster remarked, in a 2010 opinion,27 that
companies could use exclusive forum charter provisions as protection
against multiforum litigation.28 The suggestion coincided with an uptick
in shareholder suits involving claims based on Delaware law being filed
in courts outside of Delaware—dubbed the “Anywhere but Chancery”
phenomenon29—and viewed in many quarters as a threat to the status of
the Delaware Chancery Court as “the Mother Court of corporate law.”30
Then, in 2013 and 2014, two separate Chancery Court opinions—
Boilermakers31 and City of Providence32—held that even bylaw provisions

25. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 336 (2012) (reporting that prior to 2010,
forum-terms appeared in the charters or bylaws of only sixteen publicly traded companies).
26. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN CHARTERS AND BYLAWS
11 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463314 [https://perma.cc/UNL3-V879] (discussing “unsettled
state of the law” and likelihood that bylaw provisions would be challenged as invalid).
27. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Laster, V.C.)
(postulating that “if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide
an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond
with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes”).
28. See generally Thomas T. McClendon, The Power of a Suggestion: The Use of Forum Selection
Clauses by Delaware Corporations, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067 (2012); Michael Van Gorder,
Boilermakers v. Chevron: Are Board Adopted Arbitration Bylaws Valid under the Delaware General
Corporation Law?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 443, 444 (2014) (“Dicta within a 2010 opinion of the
Delaware Court of Chancery. . . seemed to provide approval of forum selection clauses within a
corporation’s governing documents.”).
29. See generally Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the
“Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199 (2008).
30. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1346 & n.3 (2012) (citing
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990)).
31. Boilmakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del. Ch. 2013).
32. City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 240 (Del. Ch. 2014).

11 - Hershkoff & Kahan.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

FORUM-SELECTION PROVISIONS

3/18/2018 6:44 PM

273

designating Delaware courts, or courts of another state, as exclusive fora
were facially valid.33
To add a forum-term in a charter (a.k.a. certificate of incorporation), as
Vice-Chancellor Laster suggested, a majority of shareholders would have
to vote in favor of such a provision.34 To add a forum-term to a bylaw, by
contrast, shareholder approval generally is not required. Rather, in most
companies, the board of directors can approve bylaw amendments.35
In 2015, the Delaware legislature stepped in and added a provision to
the state’s corporate code—Section 115—to make clear that either the
charter or the bylaws of a Delaware corporation may include a forumselection provision for “internal corporate claims,” defined to include
claims “based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director
or officer or stockholder in such capacity” or as to which the Delaware
General Corporation Law “confers jurisdiction upon the Court of
Chancery.”36 Such a term may designate “any or all of the courts in this
State,” but it may not “prohibit bringing such claims in the courts” of
Delaware.37 In effect, Section 115 codified the 2013 decision permitting
bylaw provisions to designate Delaware courts as the exclusive fora. But
it overruled the 2014 decision permitting the provision to designate
another state’s court as an exclusive forum. Connecticut,38 Indiana,39 New

33. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 954 (Strine, C.); City of Providence, 99 A.3d at 240 (Bouchard, C.)
(“I do not discern an overarching public policy of this State that prevents boards of directors of
Delaware corporations from adopting bylaws to require stockholders to litigate intra-corporate
disputes in a foreign jurisdiction.”); see also Choupak v. Rivkin, No. CV 7000-VCL, 2015 WL
1589610, at *19 n.3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 2015), judgment entered (Del. Ch. May 12, 2015), and aff’d
129 A.3d 232 (2015).
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2017).
35. Id. § 109(a).
36. Id. § 115.
37. Id. (effectively overruling City of Providence, 99 A.3d at 229, except with respect to
stockholders agreement or agreement signed by stockholder).
38. Act effective Oct. 1, 2017, Pub. Act. No. 17-108, 2017 Conn. Pub. Acts 108.
39. IND. CODE § 23-1-22-2(16) (2017) (permitting designation of Indiana state or federal courts as
exclusive fora for certain disputes in company’s charter or bylaws).
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Jersey,40 North Carolina,41 Oklahoma,42 Virginia,43 and Washington44
have adopted similar provisions.
In the wake of these developments, an increasing number of Delaware
firms, as well as multiple non-Delaware firms, have adopted corporate
forum-terms.45 As of mid-2014, the most recent date for which data are
available, the number of U.S. public corporations that had adopted such
provisions stood at 746.46 Since then, that number is likely to have grown
substantially.
Forum-terms have two principal structural components. First, the terms
designate a court as an exclusive forum, unless the corporation consents
to a different forum. Delaware companies generally split in selecting just
the Delaware Chancery Court as the exclusive forum or also including
other Delaware state courts and the Delaware federal district court;47 nonDelaware companies generally have designated both their local state court
and the federal court in that state as fora.48
Second, the terms specify the claims that can be litigated only in the
selected forum. Not surprisingly, the terms channel “internal affairs” to
the selected forum. However, some terms arguably go beyond that
category. For example, some terms include actions “asserting a claim of
breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee
of the Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s

40. Act of Jan. 16, 2018, ch. 356, 2017 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. (West).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-50 (2017).
42. Act of May 22, 2017, ch. 323, § 3, 2017 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. (to be codified at OKLA. STAT.
tit. 18, § 1014.2).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-624 (2017) (permitting designation of Virginia courts or courts in state
of company’s principal office as exclusive fora for certain disputes).
44. Act of Apr. 17, 2017, ch. 28, § 9, 2017 Wash. Legis. Serv. 96 (to be codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 23B.02).
45. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, TRENDS IN EXCLUSIVE FORUM BYLAWS, DIR. NOTES, CONF. BOARD
GOVERNANCE CTR. (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411715 [https://
perma.cc/U62K-WRRA] (listing companies); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private
Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper 21362, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21362 [https://perma.cc/56MQ-BKYV].
46. Romano & Sanga, supra note 45, at 2.
47. ALLEN, supra note 45, at 4 (reporting that, post-Boilermakers, 43% of terms selected the
Chancery Court as exclusive forum, 23% selected the state and federal courts in Delaware, and 34%
selected the Delaware Chancery or state courts and the Delaware federal court only if the state court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction).
48. See, e.g., BYLAWS OF NORDSTROM, INC., art. II, § 14 (Amended and Restated as of June 7,
2017) (designating state and federal courts in King County, Washington as exclusive fora); BYLAWS
OF SKYLINE CORP., art. VIII, § 2 (Amended and Restated as of June 1, 2017) (designating state and
federal courts in Elkhart County, Indiana as exclusive fora).
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shareowners,”49 which would seem to embrace insider trading claims.50
Other terms refer to any actions “based upon a violation of a duty by a
current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity,”51
which may include a host of non-internal affairs claims (for example,
employment discrimination claims).
Beyond the forum selected and the claims covered, some terms set
conditions on when the selected forum must be used. For example, some
terms condition use of the selected forum on its having subject-matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over indispensable parties. Other
terms attempt to insulate the selected forum from challenge by deeming
any shareholders who acquire stock after the provision was adopted to
have consented to personal jurisdiction in the selected-forum court in a
proceeding brought to enforce the exclusive forum-term.52
The Delaware courts that have considered challenges to corporate
forum-terms have looked at the question in the context of bylaw forumterms. These courts have reasoned that corporate bylaws are contracts.
Thus, the Delaware Chancery Court’s 2013 decision in Boilermakers
notes that the bylaw provision providing for Delaware as a forum for
litigating internal affairs disputes is a “valid and enforceable contractual
forum selection [provision]”;53 that “bylaws . . . constitute part of a
binding broader contract”;54 and that forum-selection provisions in
bylaws are “enforceable under Delaware law to the same extent as other
contractual forum selection clauses.”55 City of Providence—the 2014
Chancery decision which upheld a bylaw provision opting for North
Carolina as the exclusive forum for intra-corporate disputes of a Delaware
corporation—likewise contains extensive references to this contractual
rationale.56

49. ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, supra note 22, art. XI, at 35.
50. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (premising insider trading liability on the breach of
a fiduciary or similar duty).
51. See COLUCID PHARMACEUTICALS INC., FIFTH AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF
INCORPORATION OF COLUCID PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (FORM 8-K, Ex. 3.1), art. 10.1 (2015).
52. See ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, supra note 22, art. XI, at 35; Allen, supra note 45, at 5.
53. Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 940 (emphasis added). Boilermakers emphasized that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
approach to contractual forum-selection terms, which Delaware has adopted as a matter of state law,
a forum-term is not valid if it is unreasonable. See also Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143 (Del.
2010) (relying on M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 1 (1972)).
56. See, e.g., City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 233 (Del. Ch.
2014) (“[B]ylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the
directors, officers, and stockholders.”) (citations omitted).
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Delaware’s view of the validity of a bylaw forum-term is important
because the law of the state of incorporation will determine the validity of
a corporate forum-term as a matter of corporate law. Because the content
of a charter or bylaw is, in the first instance, an issue of the corporation’s
“internal affairs,” the validity of a forum term under the corporate law of
the company’s state of incorporation is a prerequisite to its enforceability.
Delaware now treats a corporate forum-term as a valid clause, subject to
an as-applied challenge for breach of fiduciary duty or other unfairness.
However, whatever Delaware’s view of the validity of a corporate
forum-term of a Delaware corporation (or a sister state’s view in a
comparable circumstance), the decision to have litigation proceed in a
forum not selected in the forum-term generally will be made by a court in
a state that was not selected by that clause. The handful of courts that have
considered the enforceability of a bylaw forum-term when suit has been
filed in a non-selected forum have applied forum law, not Delaware law,
to decide the question. For the most part, these courts have accepted the
contractual rationale articulated by Boilermakers.57 The only court so far
to have refused to enforce a forum-term is the California federal district
court in Galaviz v. Berg,58 which held that a forum-term unilaterally
adopted by the board mid-stream “after the majority of the purported
wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred” was unenforceable because it
lacked any showing “of mutual consent” to the choice of forum.59
57. E.g., Billard v. Angrick, 220 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.D.C. 2016) (granting motion to dismiss suit
on forum non conveniens grounds because bylaw designated the Delaware Chancery Court as
exclusive forum); In re CytRx Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., No. CV14-6414-GHK, 2015 WL
9871275 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015) (same); Butorin ex rel. KBR Inc. v. Blout, 106 F. Supp. 3d 833
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (holding bylaw designating Delaware courts enforceable and transferring case to
U.S. District Court for District of Delaware); North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 642 (S.D.
Ohio 2014) (citing Melissa’s Trust v. Seton, No. 14 C 02068, 2014 WL 3811241, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July
31, 2014)); Groen v. Safeway, Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 3405752 (Cal. Super. May 14, 2014)
(looking to Boilermakers as source for general contractual principles); Transcript of Oral Argument
at 38–47, Miller v. Beam, Inc., No. 2014-CH-00932, 2014 WL 8664334 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 2014);
Katz v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001299, 2014 WL 9913855, slip op. at *22–26 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 19, 2014); Genoud v. Edgen Grp., Inc., No. 625,244, 2014 WL 2782221, slip. op. (La. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 17, 2014); HEMG Inc. v. Aspen Univ., No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 5958388, slip op. (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2013).
58. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (as matter of first impression, corporation could not
dismiss action for lack of venue based on forum-term in bylaw).
59. Id. at 1173–74. A later federal court punted on the question, finding that the challenged forumterm had not yet become effective. In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F. Supp.
2d 445, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An Oregon state court declined to enforce a Delaware bylaw term,
adopted two days before a merger announcement, finding that it violated a state policy against
enforcing contracts that lack “mutual assent.” Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductors, Inc., No. 140202441, 2014 WL 4147465, at *4 (Or. Cir. Aug. 14, 2014). But the Oregon Supreme Court, en banc,
entered mandamus relief finding no such compelling policy under state law. Roberts v. TriQuint
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RESISTING THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO CHARTER
AND BYLAW FORUM-TERMS

In our view, the validity and enforceability of the corporate forum-term
ought not to be treated as a matter of ordinary contract law. Corporate
forum-terms differ significantly from ordinary contracts, and invoking the
contract rationale obfuscates the underlying considerations that bear on
terms of this sort.60 In this Part, we explain our skepticism about applying
ordinary contract principles in assessing the validity and enforceability of
forum-terms in corporate charters and bylaws. First, we show why the
state’s role as a party to the corporate “contract” cuts against having a
court treat a charter or bylaw forum-term as an ordinary contract when the
issue arises in litigation. Second, we take the contract argument on its own
terms, discussing whether a charter and bylaw forum-term manifests the
requisite degree of assent needed to validate a contact.
A.

The State as Party to the Corporate “Contract”

The contractual approach to corporate forum-terms treats the
corporation’s constitutive documents—its charter and bylaws—as
contracts. Contractual parties may agree to waive access to a federal
forum, to designate venue in a particular state court, and to give up rights
to damages or to jury trials. Under the contractual approach, these terms
carry a presumption of respect—and are not subject to certain
constitutional limitations—because they are the product of a private
arrangement in which parties consented to modify their entitlements.
A corporation’s charter and bylaws, however, are no ordinary
contracts. They are instead a hybrid between an ordinary contract and state
law—they are highly regulated constitutive documents that order
collective decision-making.61 Both formally and functionally, corporate
law conceives of the state as an integral party to the corporate “contract,”
Semiconductors, Inc., 364 P.3d 328 (Or. 2015). See Eleanor J. Vincent, Note, The Implications of
Oregon’s TriQuint Decision for Enforcing Forum Selection Bylaws, 94 OR. L. REV. 223, 225 (2015)
(criticizing TriQuint and discussing “strong policy considerations” in favor of enforcing corporate
forum-terms of “consistency, efficiency, and judicial expertise”).
60. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
257, 259 (2015) (arguing that contract law principles do “not support the results reached in
Boilermakers”); Randall S. Thomas, What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation in
M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1953–56 (2013) (expressing skepticism about the
enforceability of forum selection bylaws as contracts).
61. The literature is canonical and voluminous. See, e.g., Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Corporate
Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155 (1957); Louis L. Jaffe,
Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
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and assigns powers to the state that are not typical of parties to ordinary
contracts.
Consider, first, the formal argument about state involvement in the
corporate “contract.” Delaware courts routinely describe the corporation
as a contract between the firm and the state,62 a view that is shared by
other state courts and federal courts.63 Indeed, the Delaware Supreme
Court has referred to the conception of the corporation as a “contract
between the State and the corporation, and the corporation and its
shareholders” as one of “many interacting principles of established law.”64
A corollary is that every corporate charter and bylaw “impliedly” includes
state law as a provision,65 and that the state, as a party to the charter,
reserves the right to change its terms by amending or repealing its laws.
Delaware law often is described in facilitative terms: the state’s
corporate law merely “enable[s]” private parties to incorporate “on terms
which they freely choose.”66 But this statement is only half true. While
corporate laws afford corporations significant choice in devising charter
and bylaw terms, they also impose significant constraints.67 Above all,
charters and bylaws may contain provisions dealing only with a limited
set of subjects—some specifically identified, such as whether directors
62. Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 727 (Del. Ch. 1930); see also Garry D. Hartlieb,
Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses for Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, 4 MICH.
BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 131, 140 & n.54 (2014) (“a corporation’s governance documents
are ‘a contract between the State and the corporation, and the corporation and its shareholders’”)
(citing Lawson, 152 A. at 727).
63. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429 (1934); Avondale Land
Co. v. Shook, 54 So. 268, 269 (Ala. 1911); Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d
849, 852 (Fla. 1971); S. W. R. Co. v. Benton, 58 S.E.2d 905, 917 (Ga. 1950); Pac. Intermountain Exp.
Co. v. Best Truck Lines, Inc., 518 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); State ex rel. Swanson v.
Perham, 30 Wash. 2d 368, 374, 191 P.2d 689, 693 (1948); see also 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 64
(2017).
64. STARR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Del. Ch. 1991). See Wylain, Inc. v.
TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 344 (Del. Ch. 1979) (“[T]he corporate charter, (1) is a contract between
the state and the corporation; (2) is a contract between the corporation and its stockholders; and (3) is
a contract between the stockholders inter se.” (citations omitted)).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (2017) (“This chapter and all amendments thereof shall be a part
of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every corporation.”). See also Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 24 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. Ch. 1942) (“[T]here is impliedly written
into every corporate charter as a constituent part thereof the pertinent provisions of the State
Constitution and statutes.”).
66. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252 (1977).
67. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Cox, supra note 60, at 278–84 (arguing
that restrictions on private ordering imposed by corporate law conflict with nexus-of-contracts
paradigm).
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can be removed without cause, and others generically identified, such as
“any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of
the affairs of the corporation.”68 Within the set of permissible subjects, the
content of a charter or bylaw provision often is constrained—for example,
in Delaware, a charter cannot provide that directors of a corporation with
a non-classified board can be removed only for cause.69 Likewise, state
law highly regulates the mode by which charters and bylaws may be
amended. Thus, any charter amendment in Delaware requires an
affirmative recommendation by the board of directors and the approval by
at least a majority of shares entitled to vote.70
Section 115 illustrates both the enabling elements and the presence of
constraints. A corporation may choose whether to include a forum-term
in its charter or bylaws. But the scope of permissible terms is limited: no
forum-term may oust Delaware as a forum.71
Second, at the functional level, the Boilermakers court referred to the
relationship between the directors and shareholders as a “flexible”
contract.72 This characterization is consistent with treating the state as a
third party to a corporate “contract” in light of its role in revising, adding,
and eliminating terms from the corporation’s charter and bylaws. Indeed,
an influential characterization of the corporation as a long-term relational
contract emphasizes the fact that the “contract” delegates authority to
revise contractual terms on an on-going basis to one party—the state—
which serves as a “third-party contracting agent for corporate investors
and managers”73 and can “[t]hrough statutory amendments or judicial
decisions . . . in effect, alter the corporate charter when the need arises.”74
Corporations are said to have an incentive to defer to terms that are
provided by statute or decisional law because participating public

68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1).
69. Id. § 141(k).
70. Id. § 251. A charter may not relax the shareholder voting requirements supplied by state law.
Id. § 102(b)(4).
71. Id. § 115.
72. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013) (calling
corporate bylaws “part of a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders
formed within the statutory framework of the [Delaware General Corporate Law]” and stating that
the contract “is, by design, flexible and subject to change in the manner that the DGCL spells out”).
For a criticism of validating forum-terms on the basis of a flexible contract that fails to manifest true
shareholder consent, see Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an Agency
Lens, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 269 (2015).
73. Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1, 14 (2006).
74. Id. at 9.
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institutions—the legislature and the courts—are regarded as “relatively
durable and trustworthy third parties.”75
Section 115 and the earlier court decisions validating corporate forumterms conform to this identified pattern. They grant boards the power
(perhaps new, perhaps always present but previously not recognized) to
include a forum-selection clause in either the corporate charter or the
bylaws. These powers presumably have become more desirable due to the
growth of multi-forum litigation. Thus, the fact that state law has changed
or clarified the board’s power, coupled with the board’s increased
“private” decision to exercise such power, reflect the “flexible” nature of
the corporate contract and the state’s involvement in it.
In sum, the state plays an unusual and large role in the “contractual”
regime constituted by charters, bylaws, and state law. State law, in
particular statutory law, extensively regulates the permitted content of
charters and bylaws; state law continuously revises and adds terms—optin provisions, opt-out provisions, and, less commonly, mandatory
provisions—to the charters and bylaws; state corporate law is conceived
as implied provisions of the “corporate contract”; the state itself is
conceived as a notional party to that contract; and, most tellingly, the state
reserves the right to change charter and bylaw terms ex post—by adopting
laws making such terms invalid—without running afoul of the Contracts
Clause.76 This degree of state involvement, and the state’s retention of the
power to revise charter terms ex post, cannot be reconciled with the
ordinary principles of contract law that have been applied to conventional
forum-terms outside the context of charters and bylaws.
B.

Corporate Bylaws, “Contracts,” and the Myth of Shareholder
Consent

So far we have argued that the state’s participation in the corporate
“contract” argues against treating a corporate charter or bylaw as an
ordinary contract when it regulates access to the courts. Now we consider
the charter/bylaw-as-contract argument on its own terms. Contractual
forum-terms arguably differ from legislative venue rules not simply
because of the level of state involvement, but also because parties to a
contract typically are assumed to have given consent to the term—thus
75. Id. at 15.
76. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 589–91 (1819) (holding that
corporate charter is a contract between the state and the person to whom the charter is granted within
the meaning of the Contracts Clause). See Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations
and Vested Rights, 6 MARQ. L. REV. 129, 132 (1922) (explaining that the state’s use of a “reserved
power clause” avoids the effect of the Dartmouth College rule).
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volitionally giving up important interests, including waiving the right to
commence a suit other than in the selected forum or to transfer the suit
from the designated forum.77
The general rule is that a court ought to enforce a contract because the
parties have agreed to its terms.78 Party consent is the touchstone of
contractual validity, and respecting the parties’ consent through
contractual enforcement reinforces notions of autonomy, encourages
innovation, and promotes efficiency. However, these standard principles
suffer serious distortion when applied to corporate forum-terms.79
To start, who are the parties who have consented to the corporate
“contract?” Delaware courts have waffled in their response to this
question. Boilermakers, for example, stated that “the bylaws of a
Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among
the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory
framework.”80 Other cases and passages refer to these documents as
contracts “among a corporation’s shareholders,”81 as contracts “both
between the corporation and the state and the corporation and its
stockholders,”82 as contracts “between the stockholders, the directors and
officers, and the corporation” or as contracts “between corporations and
stockholders.”83
Corporate forum-terms, however, encompass claims brought by
persons who are not mentioned in any of these formulations—persons
whom not even Delaware seems to regard as parties to the corporate
“contract.” To take one example, creditors of insolvent corporations,
including involuntary creditors such as tort victims, can assert claims of
77. E.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161, 165–66 (2015)
(defending validity of bylaw forum-term through a “doctrine of corporate consent”).
78. Omri Ben-Shachar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual
Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1829 (2004) (“One of the pillars of the law of contract formation
is the principle of mutual assent.”).
79. Our argument that charters and bylaws lack the degree of consent found in ordinary contracts
does not imply that these governance documents should not be treated as analogous to contracts in
certain respects. Thus, it may make sense, as held by the Delaware Supreme Court, to apply principles
of contract interpretation to the interpretation of ambiguous charter provisions. Airgas, Inc. v. Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010). What is significant is determining when and
why the contractual paradigm should dominate and when it should not.
80. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013).
81. Airgas, 8 A.3d at 1188. See also Patrick J. Rohl, The Reassertion of the Primacy of Delaware
and Forum Selection Bylaws, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 143, 145, 145 n.19 (2015) (citing Airgas
for the proposition that Delaware courts apply non-contractual principles to questions “that arise out
of the role of shareholders in the governance process”).
82. Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 727 (Del. 1930).
83. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 940, 949.
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breach of corporate fiduciary duties that are clearly within the scope of
Section 115.84 Similarly, various market participants, such as bondholders
or option holders, have standing to assert claims arising under the federal
securities laws.85 Claims that the CEO engaged in insider trading or
fraudulently certified a securities filing as accurate also appear to fall
within the scope of forum-terms that encompass claims “based upon a
violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder
in such capacity.”86 Indeed, even claims that an officer engaged in
employment discrimination arguably fall within the scope of Section 115.
What about shareholders—the core plaintiffs meant to be bound by
corporate forum-terms and clearly parties to the charter/bylaw “contract?”
The notion that the shareholders have consented to a forum-term often is
no more than a fiction. The strongest case for consent arises when
shareholders bought shares from the corporation, for example at an initial
public offering (IPO), and the company’s charter or bylaw at that time
already included a forum-term.87 In this situation, the degree of the
shareholder consent resembles that of a party who has “accepted” a term
embedded in a non-negotiable contract: the shareholder will have had
either actual knowledge of the forum-term or, at the least, an opportunity
to have learned about its existence before making the investment decision.
However, this form of consent is lacking when the company adds the
forum-term mid-stream, after the company has sold shares.88 Indeed, any
shareholder who did not vote in favor of the mid-stream amendment did
not consent at all to the forum-selection provision. At most, such a
shareholder consented to the rules for changing charter or bylaw terms (to
the extent these rules were established when the company initially sold
the shares).
The Delaware Chancery Court in Boilermakers relied upon this notion
of consent—consent to the rules for making changes, albeit not to the
84. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007)
(creditors of insolvent corporations have standing to assert derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims).
85. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750–51 (1975).
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2017).
87. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1825–29 (distinguishing between charter terms added midstream and terms present at the IPO).
88. See Hamermesh, supra note 77, at 169. The relevant issue is when the company sold the shares
to shareholders, not when a particular shareholder bought shares in the secondary market. A secondary
market buyer stands in the shoes of the secondary market seller and should have the same rights. So,
to the extent the secondary market seller “consented” to a forum-selection term, by voting in favor or
by buying from the company with actual or presumed knowledge of the presence of the term, that
consent can be imputed to the secondary market buyer. But if the provision was added mid-stream
without the vote of the secondary market seller, and the secondary market seller hence did not
“consent,” this lack of consent should also be imputed to the buyer, even if the buyer may have been
aware of the provisions at the time of the investment decision.
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changes themselves—to justify treating bylaws as contracts for purposes
of assessing forum-terms. According to Boilermakers, the contract
embodied in the bylaws
is, by design, flexible and subject to change in the manner that the
[Delaware General Corporation Law] spells out and that investors
know about when they purchase stock in a Delaware
corporation. . . . Thus, when investors bought stock [in the
companies that had adopted forum selection bylaws], they knew
(i) that . . . the certificates of incorporation gave the boards the
power to adopt and amend bylaws unilaterally; (ii) that . . .
bylaws [could] regulate the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, and the rights or powers of its stockholders;
and (iii) that board-adopted bylaws are binding on the
stockholders. In other words, an essential part of the contract
stockholders assent to when they buy stock in Chevron and FedEx
is one that presupposes the board’s authority to adopt binding
bylaws . . . .89
But, for one, this rationale proves too much. When investors buy stock,
they also know that the rules of corporate governance (including the rules
on how the rules can be changed) can be changed by legislation. Thus,
“an essential part of the [arrangement] that shareholders assent to when
they buy stock”—to paraphrase Boilermakers—“presupposes” the
legislature’s “authority to adopt binding” corporate laws.90 Under the
Boilermakers rationale, therefore, a Delaware statute that conferred
exclusive jurisdiction over “internal corporate claims” should likewise be
treated as a contract for purposes of assessing forum-terms. Such a statute,
however, would almost certainly violate the recognized limits to the
power of the state to regulate judicial access and be invalid. As a matter
of logic, therefore, the rationale in Boilermakers is fallacious.
Moreover, consent to process is not the equivalent to consent to the
substantive output of that process.91 Whether and when to enforce a term
consenting to process is a contested notion in procedural doctrine and
democratic theory.92 Simply put, having bought shares with knowledge of
89. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–40 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(emphasis added).
90. Id. at 940.
91. See Ben Walther, Bylaw Governance, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 399, 428 (2015)
(distinguishing between changes to the “rules of the game” and decisions “that occur during the game
itself”) (citing Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005)).
92. The best-known discussion in democratic theory, that consent to majoritarian decision-making
is not the same as consent to the substantive outputs of majoritarian process in all cases, remains that
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how the rules can be changed does not amount to having consented to the
changes themselves and does not generate the same presumption of
consent as having signed a contract that already contains the new rules.93
Though consent to process is never equivalent to consent to output,
several factors bear on the degree of the gap. As mentioned, amendments
to corporate charters generally require the approval of shareholders.94 To
the extent that the shareholders who approved an amendment adding a
forum-term have the same interest as those who did not, majority approval
provides a form of virtual consent by shareholders as a whole to that
provision (and actual consent by the shareholders who voted for it).
Especially in the case of representative actions brought on behalf of all
shareholders as a class, the fact that a majority of shareholders (or their
successors in interest) approved a charter amendment adding an exclusive
forum provision provides a strong basis for enforcement.
Bylaw amendments adopted by the board without a shareholder vote,
however, raise more severe concerns. While shareholders are the most
likely plaintiffs in a suit subject to the forum-term, directors are the most
likely defendants in such a suit. Any procedural device applicable to
lawsuits by a shareholder against directors inherently raises potential
conflicts of interest (potential because a shareholder-plaintiff may not
represent the interest of shareholders as a whole). When the interests of
shareholders and directors conflict, the board’s approval of a bylaw does
not amount even to virtual consent for there is no legitimate representative
proxy.95 Similarly, when the interests of shareholders conflict—for
example, in a firm with a controlling shareholder—approval of a charter

of JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981). On the
“deeply problematic” nature of process-based constitutional theory, see Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1080 (1980). For
a discussion of the serious concerns raised by contractarian theories of fair process, see Robert G.
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness,
83 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2003). For an article supporting the broad use of contract procedure in corporate
organizational documents, see Winship, supra note 14, at 531–32.
93. Consumer contracts increasingly have included terms allowing the seller or creditor a unilateral
right to modify the contract. Frequently, but not always, these change-terms allow a modification of
procedural rights that the consumer would have—for example, to file suit in court or to join in a class
action. In some of these settings, the contract at the time of formation has granted one party the
unilateral right to change a contract term. Unilateral modification rights in actual contracts raise issues
of consent that are similar to those we address in this article.
94. See supra notes 34–35.
95. The contractual analogue of permitting the board to change the bylaws unilaterally has been
dubbed “empty promises” by one influential commentary. Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty
Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“The public outrage is justified. Empty promises are prone
to abuse and should not be offered in the guise of real promises.”).
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amendment through a majority vote reflects no meaningful consent to
output by dissenting minority shareholders.
We recognize that shareholders are not necessarily helpless even when
a bylaw forum-term can be adopted without shareholder approval.
Shareholders in publicly traded corporations who oppose such a forumterm could file a precatory shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8
requesting that the board repeal the bylaw.96 Although such a resolution
is not binding, boards increasingly have implemented resolutions that
have obtained majority support.97 They also could show their displeasure
by casting “withhold” votes in the election of directors (depending on the
applicable voting rule and number of withhold votes, the effect of such
votes ranges from embarrassment to non-election of a nominee to the
board).98 To the extent that shareholders have the realistic opportunity to
take these steps and fail to do so,99 they could be viewed as having at least
passively acquiesced in the board’s action.
A final potentially ameliorating factor is that, at least in Delaware,
fiduciary duties limit the ability of the board to amend bylaws.100
Delaware courts have held that, even though the board had the formal
power to amend the bylaws, bylaw amendments that advanced the date of
a shareholder meeting thereby inhibiting the ability of dissidents to mount
a challenge or that expanded the board size and filled the vacancy thereby
preempting a shareholder attempt to expand the board size and fill
vacancies with shareholder nominees were not valid.101 Fiduciary duties
thus may impose some loosely-defined constraint on the bylaw
amendments that are adverse to the interest of shareholders and beneficial

96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017).
97. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1011–13 (2010)
(implementation rate increased from 12% in 2001 to 50% in 2008).
98. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59
EMORY L.J. 869, 888–901 (analyzing factors that contribute to withhold votes). Shareholders could
also seek to repeal a bylaw provision by a binding shareholder vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 109(a) (2017); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del. Ch.
2013) (distinguishing forum-terms from poison pills). Binding shareholder bylaw amendments,
however, are extremely rare. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance
Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2018–21 (2014).
99. Whether the opportunity is realistic depends on factors such as timing of the adoption of the
bylaw in relation to the lawsuit, the vote required for shareholders to repeal a bylaw, and the
shareholder profile.
100. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 954 (“[T]he real-world application of a forum selection bylaw
can be challenged as an inequitable breach of fiduciary duty.”) (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)).
101. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 (date of shareholder meeting); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (board expansion).
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to the personal interests of the directors. Indeed, the Delaware cases
upholding forum-selection clauses, as well as the legislative history to
Section 115, make clear that, while such clauses are not facially invalid,
they will not necessarily survive an as-applied challenge: a board may in
some circumstances breach its duty either by adopting such a clause or by
failing to waive it.102
III. REFRAMING THE DOCTRINE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CORPORATE FORUM-TERMS
The U.S. Supreme Court has favored applying a contractual approach
to forum-terms—but it has done so in cases in which the forum-term
actually is a part of a contract.103 A charter or bylaw is not an ordinary
contract. Our argument has emphasized the state’s unusual role as a party
to the “contract” with revisionary and authorizing power that is not
typically granted in the ordinary contractual setting. The observation is
not the general one of legal realism that the state is implicated in all private
deals;104 the state’s role in corporate charters and bylaws is of a different
order. Moreover, even if we were to accept charters and bylaws as a form
of private ordering, the usual contractual rules about consent are difficult
to apply to forum-terms. In particular, in the common situation of a midstream addition of a forum-term to the bylaws, shareholder consent is at
most consent to the process of amending bylaws coupled with tacit
acquiescence in the amendment approved by the board. The Supreme
Court has not yet endorsed forum-terms as valid where there is no
showing of consent to the provision.
In this Part, we consider how the state’s role in the corporate contract
ought to affect the kinds of forum-terms that permissibly may be included
in a charter or bylaw. We then take up the question of consent and show
how a properly conceived approach to corporate forum-terms would
operate in practice. Through a series of examples, we sketch out the
factors that ought to inform a court’s assessment, and the differing weights
that may be required given the facts and circumstances. Our approach
diverges from the Supreme Court’s treatment of ordinary forum-term
provisions, but the two methodologies—notwithstanding criticisms of
102. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439; Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663.
103. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., __ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 568, 583 (2013); Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 8–10 (1972).
104. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) (“Not only are existing
laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.”).
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current doctrine105—can cohabit without disruption of current jurisdiction
and venue rules.
A.

Mandatory Restraints on Corporate Forum-Terms

States that authorize corporations to adopt forum-terms in their charters
and bylaws do not mandate their inclusion; state law simply permits the
firm to adopt the provision if it so chooses. At the same time, state law
often constrains the firm’s choices by regulating the content of a
permissible forum-term; for example, if a Delaware company desires an
exclusive forum for intra-corporate disputes, that forum may not exclude
Delaware.
A key implication of our analysis is that the state’s role in the corporate
“contract” ought to bar its authorizing certain kinds of forum-terms in the
firm’s charter or bylaws. The federal Constitution prevents states from
restricting judicial access in a number of important ways106: in our view,
states ought not to be able to achieve an arguably impermissible result
through the intermediary of private ordering, and particularly in a context
that not only lacks a showing of strong party consent, but also potentially
generates negative third party effects. The problem is the inverse of the
usual private-governance problem when private parties wield quasi-public
power yet escape public forms of regulation. Rather, the danger is that a
public entity will be allowed to reach decisions that affect public life, free
from public limits because filtered through the intermediary of
“contract.”107
Given the state’s role in the corporate “contract,” what kinds of forumterms ought to be off the table or, at a minimum, subject to close scrutiny?
First, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a state may not oust
a federal court of diversity jurisdiction to hear a state cause of action, and
a corporate charter or bylaw likewise ought not to be able to oust a federal
court of diversity jurisdiction.108 Railway Co. v. Whitton’s
105. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 541–65 (criticizing the Court’s contractual paradigm
for ordinary forum terms).
106. See Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX
LITIG. 51, 67–77 (2012) (discussing various constitutional limits on state authority to restrict judicial
access).
107. See Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 289 (2013) (discussing
“state action cases in which the complaint is only with the private party’s own conduct, as to which
there is some reason to think public Constitutional Law is the appropriate governing regime”).
108. See Recent Cases, Federal Courts—Authority of State Law—Power of a State to Preclude
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1962) (“The Supreme Court has
consistently struck down attempts to oust federal jurisdiction of general causes of action created by a
state and cognizable in its courts of general jurisdiction.”).

11 - Hershkoff & Kahan.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/18/2018 6:44 PM

288

[Vol. 93:265

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Administrator,109 a chestnut of federal jurisdiction, held that a state cannot
bar the removal of an action from state to federal court by purporting to
confer exclusive state jurisdiction over the claim:
Whenever a general rule as to property or personal rights, or
injuries to either, is established by State legislation, its
enforcement by a Federal court in a case between proper parties
is a matter of course, and the jurisdiction of the court, in such a
case, is not subject to State limitation.110
The reason for this restriction draws from the constitutional concerns
that motivate the inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in Article III of the
Federal Constitution: fear of legislative capture by in-state factions and of
judicial bias against non-state citizens.111 For similar reasons, a state may
not bar a litigant from filing or prosecuting an in personam action in a
federal court within the grant of arising-under jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.112 These concerns do not dissipate when the ouster is done
through private mechanisms that privilege in-state parties.
Second, as a matter of Full Faith and Credit,113 a state generally cannot
discriminate in favor of its own courts to the detriment of the courts of
sister states.114 A limited exception for public policy is recognized, but
rarely found in practice.115 Thus, a state could not simply refuse to enforce
109. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872).
110. Id. at 286.
111. See Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III Judges: Geography,
Identity, and Bias, 79 MO. L. REV. 119, 124 (2014) (“Diversity jurisdiction allows a litigant to escape
the potential unfair bias in state court by bringing his or her claim in federal court.”). See generally
Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the “Inside-Outsider,” 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291
(1986).
112. Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 16 (1977) (“[T]he right to litigate in federal court is
granted by Congress and, consequently, ‘cannot be taken away by the state.’”) (quoting Donovan v.
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964)). Of course, the state can define state causes of action, and in that
way significantly affect whether a claim will fall within the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
114. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 320–21 (1992) (arguing that although the
Full Faith and Credit Clause creates “the need for a single applicable law, identifiable in advance,”
“[a] case can be decided by any court that acquires jurisdiction over the defendant . . . .”). A limited
exception to this principle relates to matrimonial and certain in rem claims. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin,
215 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1909) (“[W]here the suit is strictly local, the subject-matter is specific property,
and the relief, when granted, is such that it must act directly upon the subject-matter, and not upon the
person of the defendant, the jurisdiction must be exercised in the state where the subject-matter is
situated.” (citations omitted)).
115. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–48 (1935)
(“One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by
the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the
conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It follows

11 - Hershkoff & Kahan.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

FORUM-SELECTION PROVISIONS

3/18/2018 6:44 PM

289

the judgment of another state court.116 Similarly, state statutes generally
cannot vest exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of a state and deprive sister
states of jurisdiction.117 As the Supreme Court has explained:
[A] state cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same
time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in
any court having jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is to be determined
by the law of the court’s creation, and cannot be defeated by the
extraterritorial operation of a statute of another state, even though
it created the right of action.118
Under this analysis, the discriminatory feature of most forum-term
laws—which permit the designation of the state of incorporation’s courts
as exclusive fora, but not of courts of any other state—at the least raises

that not every statute of another state will override a conflicting statute of the forum by virtue of the
full faith and credit clause; that the statute of a state may sometimes override the conflicting statute
of another, both at home and abroad; and, again, that the two conflicting statutes may each prevail
over the other at home, although given no extraterritorial effect in the state of the other.”). An
exception is provided for judgments rendered by courts without subject-matter jurisdiction, but a
judgment is entitled to a presumption of facial validity. See V.L. v. E.L., __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1017,
1020 (2016) (“A State is not required . . . to afford full faith and credit to a judgment rendered by a
court that ‘did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the relevant parties.’” (citing
Underwriters Nat. Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 455 U.S. 691,
705 (1982))).
116. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 235–36, 238 (1908) (Mississippi could not deny respect to
Missouri judgment based on gambling transaction on ground that gambling contracts are not to be
enforced “by any court”); see also Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose,
252 U.S. 411, 415 (1920) (holding that Illinois statute prohibiting prosecution of wrongful death
where death had occurred in another state did not prevent enforcement of Alabama ruling, and
explaining, “[w]hether the Illinois statute should be construed as the Mississippi Act was construed
in Fauntleroy v. Lum was for the Supreme Court of the State to decide, but read as that Court read it,
it attempted to achieve a result that the Constitution of the United States forbade”).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (claimlocalizing statutes do not deprive sister states of power to hear claim).
118. Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914); see Note, Protection for
Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Corporations, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1030,
1039 n.64 (1958) (“The various legislatures, in specifying which courts are appropriate within their
own states, probably are not concerned with and do not intend to affect the bringing of suits in other
states. Further, even if the statutes are intended to foreclose suit in other states, they may be ineffective
to do so.”) (citing Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 354). The Tennessee Coal principle was subject to limits
set out by the decision itself: where “the right and the remedy” are “so inseparably united as to make
the right dependent upon its being enforced in a particular tribunal,” a forum-state’s jurisdiction may
be restricted. Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 359. However, in subsequent cases, this aspect of Tennessee
Coal has been “eroded,” so that “the State of the forum may ‘supplement’ or ‘displace’ the remedy
of the other State, consistently with constitutional requirements.” Crider v. Zurich Ins., 380 U.S. 39,
42–43 (1965) (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 414 (1955)) (citing Alaska Packers, 294 U.S.
at 544). We do not need to identify the precise limits of this principle to make our point: that when it
comes to jurisdiction and judicial access, states function under different constraints than private
parties and the use of the corporate form does not dilute or mitigate the concern driving the constraint.
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constitutional concerns that are not present when private parties agree to
jurisdiction-limiting terms in a contract.
Third, a state may not create a property interest and then attach
procedural limitations to that interest which effectively eliminate legal
protection.119 Although the principle has unclear boundaries, common
sense suggests that a forum provision vesting jurisdiction over a claim
exclusively in a court that either lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or
lacked personal jurisdiction over an indispensable party—and hence
would not be able to offer any relief—may amount to an unconstitutional
denial of due process.
Fourth, the Dormant Commerce Clause limits a state’s power to
legislate in ways that discriminate against out-of-state interests, and its
central target is state protectionist legislation. A state law that facially
violates this rule is subject to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity”120—as
described by the Court, “the strictest scrutiny of any purported local
purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.”121 In
addition, even laws that do not facially discriminate may run afoul of the
Commerce Clause if they burden or interfere with interstate commerce. In
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,122 the Court expressed this bar in terms of a
balancing test: “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”123
The statutes adopted by Delaware and several other states authorizing
the use of corporate charter/bylaw forum-terms on their face create an
asymmetry in favor of the state’s own courts and against the courts of
other states; they permit a domestic corporation to designate an exclusive
forum, but only if that forum is located in the state of incorporation. No
other state’s court may be selected. Arguably, such statutes run afoul of
the per se rule of invalidity as a form of facial discrimination against outof-state interests.
119. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1982) (holding that due process
was violated when the state dismissed an administrative claim as untimely when the agency had failed
to schedule a conference within the allowable time period).
120. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). To overcome this presumption,
a state would generally have to show that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.
E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (upholding fish import ban because it protected
native fisheries from risk of parasitic infection and adulteration that could not be served as well by
available nondiscriminatory means) (citing City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627).
121. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
122. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
123. Id. at 142.
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To be sure, the rule of per se invalidity is subject to an important
exception: a state may engage in self-promotion when the challenged law
is aimed at favoring the state itself or its subdivisions, as distinct from
private entities within the state.124 Delaware has an interest in maintaining
its corporate-law brand—a composite of attractive law, efficient
administration, and specialized courts with expertise and experience.125
By bundling law and judicial decision-making together through the device
of a law that privileges its own courts, as Section 115 does, Delaware
engages in permissible discrimination if the law’s intent and effect are to
aid the state by attracting corporate charters and generating franchise tax
revenue.126 Other states, however, are not actively competing for
incorporations and would not earn increased franchise taxes. These states
have a substantially weaker self-interest in localizing disputes in their own
courts.127
The constitutional analysis changes considerably if discrimination
were designed to promote the private interest of the local bar rather than
the public interest of the state.128 From that perspective, forum-term
statutes that discriminate in favor of the state’s own courts would be seen
not as a state revenue-raising device, but rather as a rent-seeking
124. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 342–43 (2008); United Haulers Ass’n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342–44 (2007).
125. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 276–77 (1985).
126. A statute that comes within the self-promotion exception is subject to a balancing test that
considers the burdens imposed on commerce “in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike, 397
U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362. U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). To the
extent Delaware law functions as “de facto ‘national’ U.S. corporate law,” see Armour et al., supra
note 30, at 1398, other states arguably have an interest in participating in the elaboration of corporate
law and of sharing in the economic benefits that accrue from charters and litigation. Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142); see also C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994). But see Paul N. Cox, The
Constitutional “Dynamics” of the Internal Affairs Rule—a Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J.
CORP. L. 317, 318–19 (1988) (questioning whether the Court’s commerce clause analysis “is
substantially narrower than the balancing test rhetoric that the Court often employs”).
127. See generally Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for Incorporations, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2015) (discussing extent to which states compete for incorporations).
128. In proposing Section 115, the Delaware bar clearly understood that the statute could be cast
as self-interested and protectionist. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of
Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1673–74 (2016) (concluding that, although the interest
of the bar played a role in passage of the legislation, viewing the legislation as a product of lawyers’
self-interest is incomplete); Maria Slobodchikova, Comment, Forum Selection Bylaws in Delaware,
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 466, 474–76 (2015); Alison Frankel, Forum Selection Clauses Are
Killing Multiforum M&A Litigation, REUTERS (June 24, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2014/06/24/forum-selection-clauses-are-killing-multiforum-ma-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/UZ4N-KRRZ].
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mechanism by an elite subset of the local bar, consistent with the interestgroup theory of corporate law.129 We need not resolve the issue whether
any discriminatory statutes violate the Commerce Clause,130 for our point
is more modest. Discrimination of the sort entailed by forum-term statutes
at the least raises constitutional concerns that other courts may take into
account in ruling on the enforceability of a forum-term. In this sense, this
discrimination constrains the kinds of forum-terms that may be included
in a charter or bylaw.131
B.

Consent and the Validity or Enforceability of Corporate ForumTerms

A second implication of our analysis affects the weight that ought to be
given to party consent when a court assesses the validity and
enforceability of a corporate forum-term. The contractual approach to
forum-terms makes party consent the touchstone of validity.
Enforceability is another matter. Disputes about forum-terms typically
come into play when a lawsuit is filed in a court not designated in the
corporate charter or bylaw. If the action is filed in state court, state law
will govern whether the party seeking to enforce the forum-term should
move to dismiss on the merits, for improper venue, or on grounds of forum
129. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987). As others have noted, Delaware has in effect
assigned legislative agenda-setting for corporate law amendments to a private group—a committee
of the corporate bar. See Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s
Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 70 (2009) (describing the practice of having the
corporate bar responsible for adapting and revising the Delaware code, subject to ratification by the
General Assembly).
130. We have identified no successful Commerce Clause challenge to a state restriction on
jurisdiction of the sort implicated in forum-terms. The most analogous rulings are to tolling statutes
that have been invalidated, insofar as they bar non-state corporations from the protections of statutes
of limitations unless they submit to personal jurisdiction within the state. E.g., Bendix Autolite Corp.
v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 892 (1988) (“To gain the protection of the limitations period,
Midwesco would have had to appoint a resident agent for service of process in Ohio and subject itself
to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts.”); cf. Cox, supra note 126, at 344–45 (discussing the
market participant exception to discriminatory state laws, and asking but not answering whether the
Dormant Commerce Clause bars a state from “authorizing private conduct for the purpose of
encouraging retention of corporate assets within the state,” and recognizing that corporations, because
their “existence and attributes are state determined,” may be “characterized legitimately as
instruments of state policy”).
131. See Jeff C. Dodd & James Edward Maloney, Keeping Current: Delaware Passes Legislation
Prohibiting Fee-Shifting Bylaws and Validating Exclusive Forum Selection Bylaws for Stock
Corporations, BUS. L. TODAY (A.B.A. Bus. L. Sec., Chicago, Ill.), Aug. 2015, https://www.american
bar.org/publications/blt/2015/08/keeping_current.html [https://perma.cc/98K3-3D2M] (questioning
whether exclusive forum-term giving differential treatment to Delaware and foreign courts as
exclusive “will draw a constitutional attack”).
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non conveniens.132 If the action is filed in federal court, the party seeking
to enforce the forum-term would move to transfer to another federal
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or to dismiss on grounds of forum
non conveniens if the forum-term lists a state court or a non-federal court,
such as the court of a foreign country.133 When the parties to a contract
have specified a forum for disputes arising from their contract, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that courts should enforce the clause “[i]n all but
the most unusual cases,”134 directing that the district court is to accord no
weight to the plaintiff’s private interests and to consider only public
factors bearing on the decision to transfer or dismiss.135 The Court’s
approach does not bind state courts,136 but it is influential.137
In our view, private factors ought not automatically drop out of the
enforceability calculus for charter or bylaw forum-terms. Rather, given
the attenuated nature of party consent to some corporate forum-terms,
private factors deserve consideration, at least in some litigation contexts;
likewise, consent ought not automatically ensure a term’s validity or
enforcement if public factors tilt in favor of an alternative forum.138
1.

The Absence of Any Consent

Forum-terms should not be enforced in circumstances when the
plaintiffs have given no consent at all—not even meaningful consent to
the process for amending charters and bylaws—to the provision. Such
consent is generally lacking for any claim that is not either a derivative

132. See generally J. Zak Ritchie, Note, A Tie That Binds: Forum Selection Clause Enforceability
in West Virginia, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 95 (2010).
133. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., __ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 568, 576 (2013). The
Supreme Court left open whether a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P 12(b)(6) would also be
appropriate. Id. at 580 n.4.
134. Id. at 583.
135. Id. at 581–82.
136. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991) (“federal law governs the
enforceability of the forum-selection clause” in a cruise-passenger ticket in an admiralty suit); Stewart
Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28–32 (1988) (law of lex fori applied in diversity action).
137. See Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law of Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
643, 672–73 (2015).
138. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a variant of the problem in the context of an
ordinary contractual forum-term resisted by persons who were not parties to the contract. Given the
complete absence of consent, the appeals court found error in the district court’s failure to consider
private factors, explaining, “where the Atlantic Marine framework would wholly deprive noncontracting parties of their right to seek transfer on the basis of their private interests, the customary
§ 1404(a) analysis guarantees them that right.” In re Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d 390, 403
(3d Cir. 2017).

11 - Hershkoff & Kahan.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/18/2018 6:44 PM

294

[Vol. 93:265

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

claim asserted on behalf of the corporation or a claim asserted by a
shareholder.
As we have discussed, some forum-terms encompass claims “based
upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or
stockholder in such capacity.”139 This broad phrasing would include
claims by security holders other than shareholders under the federal
securities laws or even more mundane claims, such as a claim for
employment discrimination. In addition, many jurisdictions, including
Delaware, treat veil-piercing claims by creditors as claims governed by
the internal affairs doctrine.140 Because forum-terms generally include
“any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine,”
such claims would also be swept into the scope of forum terms. Either of
these claims, for example, also would fall within the scope of Section 115
of Delaware law.141
But as to claims that are neither claims by stockholders nor derivative
claims,142 the plaintiffs cannot fairly be said to have consented either to
the substance of a forum-term or to the process by which such a term may
be inserted into a charter or bylaw. Some of the plaintiffs who may have
such claims (such as tort creditors seeking veil piercing) may not have
voluntarily engaged in any transaction with the company. Others, such as
non-shareholder security holders, employees, or contract creditors, may
have taken a voluntary action with regard to the company, such as entering
into a contract or buying securities. But, unlike a shareholder, they neither
have any power over the content of a charter or a bylaw nor any reason to
believe that the terms of a charter or bylaw could reduce their contractual
rights or any rights arising under non-corporate laws.143
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2017).
140. See Gregory Scott Crispi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should
Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 85, 90 (2008).
141. The former would be claims based on a violation of a duty by a director or officer in such
capacity; the latter would be claims as to which the Chancery Court has jurisdiction as well as,
arguably, claims based upon a violation of a duty by a stockholder in such capacity. See L.B. Labs,
Inc. v. Lance Indus., Inc., No. CIV. A 5253, 1981 WL 318274, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1981)
(Chancery Court has exclusive jurisdiction over veil piercing claims).
142. Creditors of insolvent corporations have standing to pursue derivative claims, such as claims
for self-dealing by corporate fiduciaries that normally are pursued by shareholders. N. Am. Catholic
Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). Creditors in these cases are
residual claimants that stand in the position normally occupied by shareholders (who lack incentives
to pursue these claims if the company is insolvent).
143. The Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise upheld the validity of forum-selection term in a
consumer contract that was merely a form provision and not subject to negotiation. See Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991). However, the Court emphasized in its decision
that the party against whom the term applied conceded having had notice of the term. The Court left
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Corporate Forum-Terms and the Problem of Ineffective Relief

Forum-terms become problematic when the selected forum is not an
efficient or effective forum to adjudicate the entire dispute. This problem
can arise when the selected forum lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
some of the claims or personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants.
These defects could weigh against the enforcement of a forum-term
even if the suit involves, for example, an intra-corporate dispute of a
Delaware corporation and the forum-term selects Delaware as a forum,
and even if consent is manifest. Almost half of the forum-terms adopted
by Delaware corporations after 2012 specify Delaware’s Chancery Court
as the exclusive forum.144 As a state court, the Chancery Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over claims under the Securities Exchange
Act.145 However claims that a company violated Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act by making misleading disclosures to
shareholders in a proxy statement146 often are intertwined with claims for
breach of fiduciary duty. This is so for two reasons. First, a misleading
open how an absence of notice would affect the validity of a forum-term and further emphasized that
forum-terms contained in form contracts are subject to review for reasonableness. Id. at 595. Whether
the ability to learn about the existence of a forum-term before making an investment decision ought
to constitute the requisite consent for validity is unclear.
We acknowledge that small shareholders do not always find it worthwhile to examine all charter
and bylaws provisions in detail before they make their investment decisions. Cf. G. Marcus Cole,
Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers Should Agree to Form Contracts Without
Even Reading Them, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 413, 438–39, 455 (2015) (stressing importance of
reading non-price terms when markets are not competitive). However, institutional aspects of publicly
traded corporations may ameliorate concerns about a lack of notice that otherwise are present in the
consumer contracts setting. According to the efficient-market hypothesis, the stock price of securities
traded in thick, public markets reflects all publicly available information. See Mark H. Van De
Voorde, The Fraud on the Market Theory and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Applying a
Consistent Standard, 14 J. CORP. L. 443, 464 & n.168 (1989) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 243–244 & n.22 (1988)). While the extent to which stock prices are “efficient” is disputed,
information on charter and bylaw provisions is relatively easy to obtain and evaluation of these terms
is aided by the fact that they tend to be standardized and common. See Michael Klausner,
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 761 (1995). Unlike
consumers who, when faced with a multi-page agreement in legalese, rationally decide not to read it,
larger institutional investors in stocks may find it worthwhile to check for and evaluate provisions in
charters and bylaws that are arguably material; even smaller investors, who do not find it worthwhile,
may be protected by the information obtained, and the corresponding investment and pricing
decisions, of the larger investors. On the other hand, it is recognized that procedural terms are difficult
to price and often are undervalued. See Cox, supra note 67, at 262.
144. Allen, supra note 45, at 4 (“Of the 112 post-Boilermakers bylaws, only 43 percent provide
that the Delaware Court of Chancery is the exclusive forum . . . .”).
145. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012); Securities Act of 1933,
§ 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
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disclosure is itself a violation of state corporate law.147 Second, because a
fully informed shareholder vote cleanses many actions that would
otherwise amount to a breach of fiduciary duty (for example, an unfair
self-dealing transaction), many suits involve an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty as well as alleged deficiencies in disclosures made to
shareholders.148 A federal court has power and could exercise discretion
to dispose both the federal claim and the state claim; the latter would be
within the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction.149 The Delaware
court, by contrast, could dispose only the state claims.
A state court also might lack personal jurisdiction over some key
defendants. The company is subject to general jurisdiction in the forum
state if that is the state in which the company is incorporated or has its
principal place of business; as such, it is amenable to suit on any claim.150
Moreover, in our view, if the company has adopted a forum-term in its
charter or bylaw in a state other than the state of incorporation, then
specific jurisdiction over the company would be appropriate as to any
claim within that clause. Furthermore, under Delaware law,151 any director
or officer of a Delaware corporation by accepting that position is deemed
to have consented to jurisdiction in the courts of that state for any claim
concerning breach of fiduciary duty.152
147. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) (citing Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 85 (Del. 1992)) (fiduciary duties require that directors disclose to shareholders
all material information bearing upon a vote).
148. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–14 (Del. 2015) (business
judgment rule is the appropriate standard of review in post-closing damages suits involving mergers
that are not subject to the entire fairness standard and that have been approved by a fully informed,
uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635,
644 (Del. 2014) (business judgment rule applies in self-dealing transactions with controlling
shareholder if transaction is approved by properly functioning independent committee and by fully
informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
150. Daimler AG v. Bauman, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tire
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)) (a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction
in its state of incorporation and its principal place of business).
151. Delaware is alone in having a director deemed-consent statute. Winship, infra note 152, at
1183 (stating that “no other states’ director consent statutes have survived”). But some states include
breach of a director’s duties among the acts covered by a long-arm statute. Id. at tbl.2 (listing sixteen
states, including Delaware). Despite the claim that the charter or bylaws constitute a contract
“between the stockholders, the directors and officers, and the corporation” (see Boilermakers Loc.
154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 949 (Del. Ch. 2013)), we are doubtful that a bylaw
forum-term on its own would confer personal jurisdiction in the designated forum over the directors,
officers, or controlling shareholders of the respective company.
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2017). The statute has covered corporate officers since 2003.
Act of June 30, 2003, 74 Del. Laws, ch. 83 (2004) (codified as DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b)).
The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 180 (Del.

11 - Hershkoff & Kahan.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

FORUM-SELECTION PROVISIONS

3/18/2018 6:44 PM

297

However, a lawsuit involving a corporation’s internal affairs may
involve additional defendants. Controlling shareholders and investment
banks often are crucial parties to a suit involving breach of fiduciary
duty.153 Controlling shareholders independently owe fiduciary duties
under Delaware law;154 investment banks are sometimes sued as aiders
and abettors of breaches by directors.155 Indeed, controlling shareholders
are generally alleged to be the principal beneficiary of a director’s breach,
and usually have the greatest ability to pay damages; and investment
banks as “aiders and abettors” may be the only party that is liable under
Delaware law for certain kinds of breach.156 If these defendants did not
engage in in-state conduct,157 they could be found to lack the requisite
contacts to support the Delaware court’s exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction over them.158

1980). However, subsequent developments in the law of personal jurisdiction have led to a rethinking
about the constitutionality of the implied-consent statute as applied to directors. See Eric A.
Chiappinelli, The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond Nicastro, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 783,
785 (2013) (arguing that Delaware relies upon an “unconstitutional amenability statute . . . to secure
in personam jurisdiction over nonresident directors and officers of Delaware corporations”).
Questions also have been raised about the constitutionality of the provision with respect to officers.
See Verity Winship, Jurisdiction over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1188–95.
153. At least one court has construed a standard exclusive forum bylaw as not covering claims
against controlling shareholders. See Anderson v. GTCR, LLC, No. 16-10-LPS, 2016 WL 5723657,
at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 1-16-CV-03870 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2016).
154. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994).
155. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 875 (Del. 2015) (upholding liability of
financial adviser).
156. In most states, companies can adopt charter provisions exculpating directors from personal
liability for certain breaches of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). Under
Delaware law, an outside party who aided and abetted these breaches would remain personally liable
even if the directors who committed these breaches avoid liability as a result of such an exculpatory
clause. See In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
RBC Capital Mkts., 129 A.3d at 875.
157. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Calif., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)
(“In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that
takes place in the forum State.’” (alteration in original) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 54 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))).
158. Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1229 (Del. Ch. 2001) (finding
jurisdiction over majority shareholder based on acts taken in Delaware in furtherance of a conspiracy),
rev’d on other grounds, 817 A.2d 249 (Del. 2002); Red Sail Easter Ltd. Partners, L.P. v. Radio City
Music Hall Prods., Inc., No. CIV. A. 12036, 1992 WL 171420, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1992)
(ownership of Delaware corporation is itself not sufficient to subject parent corporation to Delaware
jurisdiction except in double derivative suit where parent is indispensable party and would not be
exposed to pay any judgment). Whether a court has personal jurisdiction is determined as of the date
of the suit’s filing. Shatas v. Snyder, No. 73716-3-I, 2016 WL 6084113, at *5–6 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct.
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When the selected forum court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
all claims or personal jurisdiction over an indispensable party,159 an
exclusive forum provision would presumably be invalid under Section
115 of Delaware law and such terms ought not to be valid or enforceable
if authorized by the laws of other states. Alternatively, a court should hold
in such a case that fiduciary duties require the corporation to waive the
provision.
Different considerations come into play when the selected forum court
has subject-matter jurisdiction over some but not all claims or lacks
personal jurisdiction over some defendants (none of whom are
indispensable in the doctrinal sense).160 Enforcement of the forum-term
would mean that, to provide full relief, the lawsuit would have to be
divided among the courts of different states or between the federal and
state systems. Such a bifurcation in related lawsuits would result in
additional costs to the plaintiffs, the corporation, potential witnesses, and
the court system. Although principles of res judicata typically will lower
the costs of litigation by avoiding the problem of duplicative fact finding,
the federal system may have an interest in avoiding state fact finding that
will affect questions of federal law.
In this situation, consent ought to be only one of several factors
considered by the court when the validity or enforceability of the term is
at issue. If a lawsuit asserting all related claims is brought in a non-

17, 2016) (reversing trial court’s dismissal as subsequent consent to jurisdiction was insufficient to
establish jurisdiction as of the date of filing).
159. Whether a party is indispensable under Delaware law is governed by Del. Ch. Ct. R. 19(a),
which compels joinder:
[W]here complete relief cannot be accorded among the parties in the person’s absence, or where
the person claims an interest and cannot protect that interest in their absence or that interest
leaves any party subject to a substantial risk of inconsistent obligations. A necessary party should
have not only an interest in some part of the controversy but the interest must be such that a final
decree cannot be made which will neither touch upon that party’s interest nor leave the
controversy in such a state that the final determination would be inconsistent with equity and
good conscience.
Tuscan Constr. Inc. v. Capaldi, No. CV 10861-MZ, 2016 WL 3212491, at *2 & n.9 (Del. Ch. May
24, 2016) (citing Joseph v. Shell Oil. Co., 498 A.2d 1117, 1125 (Del. Ch. 1985)). In some cases, the
lack of jurisdiction over an indispensable party has been treated as grounds for dismissing the entire
lawsuit as against all parties. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Lorenzo, No. CV 10692, 1990 WL 156529, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 1990) (class action by Lorenzo alleging corporate mismanagement at Eastern
Air Lines dismissed for failure to join Eastern Air Lines).
160. For example, a controlling shareholder or an outside aider and abettor to a breach of duty
would generally not be an indispensable party in a lawsuit against board members. See, e.g., Terrydale
Liquidating Tr. v. Gramlich, 549 F. Supp. 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (no statutory basis for personal
jurisdiction under New York law against aider and abettor of federal securities law violations where
cause of action did not arise out of transaction in New York), aff’d sub nom. Terrydale Liquidating
Tr. v. Barness, 846 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1988).
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selected forum that has jurisdiction over all of the claims and parties, the
non-selected forum court should independently consider private and
public factors that bear upon party convenience and the interests of justice,
taking account of the public interest in reducing judicial costs and
ensuring effective redress. Such an analysis should include not only the
extent of the shareholders’ consent to the forum-term, but also the
significance of the claims that could not be adjudicated in the selected
forum, as well as the expertise of the selected forum in resolving those
claims that it does have power to hear.
3.

Terms that Burden Plaintiff or Promote Self-Interested Forum
Shopping

Corporate forum-terms also carry the potential for abuse both to private
interests and to public interests in such matters as law enforcement and
efficient dispute resolution. In particular, the adoption of a forum-term
may be motivated by a desire to steer litigation to a forum that is highly
inconvenient for the anticipated plaintiffs or that has procedural rules that
are unusual or prejudicial to obtaining relief for meritorious claims. We
consider the case when the company is not publicly-traded and the
selected forum is not the state of incorporation.161
In the context of a non-public corporation, the plaintiff in a lawsuit
against the company often will be a minority shareholder. Although the
stakes of the lawsuit may be significant relative to the resources of the
parties, they typically will be much smaller than the stakes in suits
involving publicly traded corporations. Having to litigate in a remote
forum could impose a significant burden on plaintiffs. The private factor
of convenience thus carries different weight, and a weight that cannot
fairly be dismissed by resorting to fictional consent given by such
plaintiff-shareholders. The public factors also will be significant. For
example, resolution of the dispute is likely to depend on witness
testimony, and not simply documentary evidence. An inconveniently
located forum thus may pose additional burdens in terms of having to
obtain discovery from non-parties outside the jurisdiction of the forum or
to secure testimony from these non-parties at trial. These costs need to be
considered when assessing whether a forum-term should be enforced.

161. This situation could arise even in Delaware. Although Section 115 of the Delaware Code does
not permit a Delaware company to include a forum-term that excludes Delaware as a forum, it permits
a clause that selects both Delaware courts and the courts of another state as exclusive fora. To the
extent that the Delaware courts lack personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, such a clause would
effectively force plaintiffs to bring a case in the courts of a state other than the state of incorporation.
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Another consideration is the ability of a forum-term to steer litigation
into a forum with procedures that may cause prejudice to plaintiffs. This
concern is heightened if the directors have adopted a forum-term for
causes of action that arose before adoption of the term or in anticipation
of a transaction likely to generate a dispute. Under basic conflicts rules, a
court is permitted to apply its own procedures to the resolution of a dispute
that involves foreign law.162 A firm’s selection of a forum other than the
state of incorporation might be a strategic maneuver to benefit from the
substantive law of the state of incorporation, coupled with the procedural
law of the state of the selected forum. To the extent that a forum-term
channels an internal corporate dispute into a forum other than the state of
incorporation, concerns about procedural fairness are potentially present,
particularly if the procedures undermine the plaintiff’s interest in an
effective remedy. Red flags ought to be raised if the selected forum has,
relative to the state of incorporation, a statute of limitations for corporate
disputes that may bar an asserted claim,163 a requirement for higher bonds
as a precondition for suits (or interim relief or appeals),164 more restrictive
notice rules for derivative lawsuits or class actions,165 or a “loser-pays”
rule that may be unfavorable to plaintiffs.166 If a forum-term designates a
forum that has procedural provisions that are materially adverse to the
plaintiff, as compared to the procedural rules of the state of incorporation,
then a forum that was adopted midstream should not be enforced unless
162. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“All matters
of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.”); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717, 722 (1988) (“Since the procedural rules of its courts are surely matters on which a State is
competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own procedural rules to actions litigated
in its courts.”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“[T]he constitutional provision for a
federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a
power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.”).
163. Compare In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 584 (2007) (citing 10 DEL. CODE ANN.
§ 8615 (2017)) (three-year period for breach of fiduciary duty claims), with Maxson v. Travis Cty.
Rent Account, 21 S.W.3d 311, 319 (Tex. App. 1999) (two-year period).
164. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 686 (1974) (noting differences in state law requirements for positing of security for expenses).
165. Compare In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 544, 555 (Minn. 2008) (under Minnesota
law, court is required to apply business judgment rule and defer to decision by a Special Litigation
Committee to approve settlement of derivative action as long as members were sufficiently
independent and pursued investigation in good faith), with Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,
789 (Del. 1981) (even if Special Litigation Committee was independent and acted in good faith, court
may use its own business judgment to determine whether motion by committee should be granted).
166. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules:
Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (1998) (noting
that “a ‘loser pays’ rule impacts disproportionately on plaintiffs’ access to the courts”).
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the plaintiff (or her predecessor in interest) actually voted in favor of that
term.167
Similar concerns can arise in two additional circumstances. First, for
claims that are not governed by the substantive law of the state of
incorporation, even a term that designates the courts of the state of
incorporation as exclusive fora may be problematic. This could be the case
when the procedural law of the selected forum state is, relative to the state
supplying the substantive law, adverse to plaintiffs. Second, forum-terms
deserve scrutiny where states differ in their conflict of laws rules and the
rules of the selected forum state point to a substantive law that is
materially more adverse to a plaintiff than the substantive law designated
by the rules of the state where the plaintiff brought a lawsuit. In all these
cases, courts should presumptively give no weight to a forum-term in a
charter or bylaw that was adopted midstream unless the plaintiff (or her
predecessor in interest) actually voted in favor of that term.
4.

Forum-Terms and Limiting Parallel Suits

We next consider how party consent to a forum-term ought to affect
the analysis when courts are faced with the problem of parallel derivative
and class action lawsuits. Corporate forum-terms do not explicitly deal
with such suits. But by channeling suits into a single forum (or two fora
if the clause permits suit in both federal and state court), they greatly
reduce the potential for parallel litigation.168
We note at the outset that applying forum-terms to derivative and class
action shareholder lawsuits raises somewhat different concerns than
applying forum-terms to non-representative suits. While shareholders
may not actually have consented to the inclusion of the forum-term in the
corporate charter or bylaw, they also will not actually have consented to
the initiation of lawsuits on their behalf in a particular forum. In other
words, forum-terms in representative litigation generally entail two
167. The inquiry would be analogous to that of an enforcing court when determining whether
offensive collateral estoppel may be asserted against a non-party to the judgment. In this situation,
the Supreme Court has looked to whether the party to be bound had a “full and fair” opportunity to
litigate in the prior action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979).
168. See, e.g., Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who
Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 41–46 (2012) (defending forum
clauses that specify the state of incorporation as the efficient solution to the problem of multijurisdictional litigation). Whether multijurisdictional litigation is a problem, or a problem of broad
scope, is questioned. See Brian J.M. Quinn, Arbitration and the Future of Delaware’s Corporate Law
Franchise, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829, 874 (2013) (“[T]here is not much evidence to
support the contention that parties are presently seeking to bring merger disputes or shareholder
disputes to forums other than Delaware.”).
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agency relationships—the named plaintiff and her lawyer as “agent” of
the shareholder class and the board that adopted the forum-term as agent
of the shareholders—where the agents may pursue their own interest at
the expense of the interests of shareholders. The possibility that institution
of the lawsuit in a non-selected forum may not be in the best interest of
shareholders even from an ex post perspective is thus uniquely present in
representative litigation.
In our view, the balance of factors may tip in favor of enforcing the
selected forum when representative suits are at issue. Courts and
commentators have argued that a significant subset of shareholder
derivative and class action lawsuits—in particular, shareholder suits filed
after a merger has been announced—lack merit.169 These lawsuits usually
allege that the board breached its fiduciary duty in approving the
merger.170 The argument that many of these suits lack merit is based on
the observation that a high percentage of mergers attract lawsuits, often
filed right after the transaction is announced;171 that many of these suits
are settled with minimal investigation of the merits;172 and that settlements
often entail no monetary recovery for the shareholder plaintiffs, but

169. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr., 834 F.2d 677, 681–82 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J.) (“Ordinarily the named plaintiffs are nominees, indeed pawns, of the lawyer, and
ordinarily the unnamed class members have individually too little stake to spend time monitoring the
lawyer—and their only coordination is through him. . . . The danger of collusive settlements . . .
makes it imperative that the district judge conduct a careful inquiry into the fairness of a settlement
to the class members before allowing it to go into effect and extinguish, by the operation of res
judicata, the claims of class members who do not opt out of the settlement.” (citations omitted)); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 686–91
(1986) (arguing that class counsel has incentive to settle early and quickly under both the percentage
of recovery and lodestar methods for determining attorneys’ fees); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(1985); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class
Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 232; Rhonda Wasserman,
Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000) (“[C]lass counsel generally face immense
pressure to settle and even to collude with the defendant to settle the class claims cheaply in exchange
for a generous fee.”).
170. Depending on the type of transaction, the breach may be reflected in agreeing to an unfair
transaction with a controlling shareholder or insider who is acquiring the company in the merger;
including deal protection measures in the merger agreement (such as termination fees or no-shop
provisions) that make it harder for a competing bidder to emerge; not following a proper process to
assure that the company is sold for the highest price; or making false or misleading disclosures to
shareholders in soliciting their votes on approving the merger.
171. See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware
Law (Mis)shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1827–29 (2004).
172. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 487–92 (2015).
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significant attorney’s fees. Critics refer to these fees as a transaction tax
that is imposed on the shareholders.173
Parallel litigation forces a defendant to bear the duplicative cost of
defending suits in several courts. These costs are ultimately borne by
shareholders, either because they continue to hold equity in the
corporation or because an acquirer, anticipating these costs, will offer a
lower amount to acquire their shares. This being said, the literature on the
topic may exaggerate these costs: lawsuits filed after a merger
announcement and settled quickly do not generate high litigation costs
because they do not generate substantial litigation activity such as
discovery or trial.
Application of the forum-term may be beneficial to the defendantcorporation and shareholders for reasons that go beyond litigation costs.
In many merger-related lawsuits, the most important procedural move
happens early in the lawsuit when plaintiffs move for a preliminary
injunction to stop the transaction from going forward during the pendency
of the lawsuit. If granted, the injunction leaves the target company in
limbo until the acquisition is consummated. During this period of limbo,
management generally is oriented towards preserving the status quo,
rather than maximizing company value. Moreover, delay increases the
risk that the transaction will never be consummated. Many merger
agreements permit the parties to a merger to walk away from the deal if
the merger is not consummated by a certain date.174 In addition, most
merger agreements include so-called “materially adverse change” clauses
which permit an acquirer to terminate the merger agreement if there are
significant changes in the business of the target that reduce its value.175
The longer the period between the signing of the agreement and its
consummation, the more likely it is that such changes have occurred.
Because publicly-traded companies involved in merger transactions often
have a value in the tens of billions of dollars, even a decline in value
resulting from status quo oriented management or the risk of non173. See, e.g., Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing
Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 108 (2014) (observing that in 2012,
90% of public company mergers and acquisitions valued at over $100 million were subject to
litigation by objecting shareholders, and concluding that “‘plaintiffs’ attorneys have successfully
attached what amounts to a transaction tax to an overwhelming majority of large public company
deals”); Rodney Yap et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for
Investors, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201202-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals
[https://perma.cc/HCV7-JGHQ].
174. See, e.g., HELIOS & MATHESON ANALYTICS INC., AGREEMENT AND PLAN OF MERGER BY AND
AMONG HELIOS AND MATHESON ANALYTICS INC., ZONE ACQUISITION, INC., AND ZONE
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., DATED AS OF JULY 7, 2016 (FORM 8-K, EX. 2.1) (2017), § 6.1(b)(i), at 54.
175. Id. §§ 2.3, 3.3, at 8–9, 22.
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consummation that is small in percentage terms can be high in absolute
dollar terms.
A preliminary injunction of a merger thus has the effect of imposing
potentially significant costs on the defendants. At the same time, the
preliminary injunction may be significantly and legitimately beneficial to
plaintiffs. In particular, the preliminary injunction may enable the
correction of materially deficient disclosures to the shareholders. Our
point is not that preliminary injunctions are never or rarely justified in the
merger context. Rather, our point is that preliminary injunctions impose
burdens on defendants even in circumstances when they are not justified
and generate no benefits to plaintiffs. The threat of obtaining a preliminary
injunction is thus fertile ground for strike suits—a situation in which the
costs to defendants so exceed the benefits to plaintiffs that the motion for
interim relief holds settlement value to the plaintiffs even though the
recovery for a litigated case was low or non-existing.
Two additional features contribute to the strike-suit potential of
injunctions. It is well recognized that preliminary injunctions carry a
greater risk than other remedies that a court might enter. For this reason,
interlocutory review is permitted on appeal in the federal system despite
the strong rule of finality that otherwise governs the appealability of
judgments; an interlocutory judgment may be reconsidered and modified
prior to final judgment.176 Although the granting of a preliminary
injunction is accompanied by an evidentiary hearing, the court’s review
of the evidence by definition is limited and provisional and so entails a
greater risk of error than fully litigated cases. Hence, injunctions may be
granted when, with a full record, they would have been denied. Moreover,
a principal cost imposed by a preliminary injunction is delay if a merger
is not permitted to go forward on the expected timetable; thus, the cost of
an improperly granted preliminary injunction would persist even if the
relief ultimately is modified after a full hearing or is overturned on appeal.
The potential for legal error in the grant of interim relief, coupled with the
costs that even a properly granted interim relief may impose, tends to
induce strike-suits aimed at obtaining such interim relief and then settling
the litigation prior to a final disposition.
Second, strategies that may ordinarily deter strike suits (such as a
defendant’s calling plaintiff’s bluff by refusing to settle and compelling
plaintiff to bear the costs of litigating a low-recovery case or developing
a reputation for not settling) may not work well in a preliminary injunction
context. Once the motion for a preliminary injunction is granted, the costs
of any delay produced by not settling may be so highly asymmetric that
176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
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defendants are under severe pressure to settle. And both because of the
high asymmetry in costs and because defendants in these cases are not
repeat players, developing a reputation for not settling these cases is
difficult. And if plaintiffs believe that they can settle the case once an
injunction is granted, they can credibly threaten to bear the limited
expense of obtaining an injunction in the first place.
Parallel litigation enhances the potential for strike suits grounded in the
threat of preliminary injunctions. Although one court may decline to issue
interim relief, another set of lawyers with a different client may seek
preliminary relief in a second court. Of course, the granting of a
preliminary injunction is a matter of equity, and as a matter of comity the
second court may not be receptive to ordering interim relief where forum
shopping is manifest. But judges differ in the degree of comity they feel
towards their sister courts. Moreover, there may be good policy reasons
for a second court to treat an earlier denial of a preliminary injunction by
a different court as not preclusive. For example, the case may have been
filed first in the second court; the plaintiffs in that court hold more
meaningful stakes and hence are better representatives; or the plaintiffs’
lawyers have engaged in more investigation. An enforceable corporate
forum-term in this context reduces the risk of strike suits based on the
threat of obtaining interim relief by limiting such suits to a single forum.
The second potential benefit of a corporate forum-term flows from
particularities of Delaware law and clauses that select Delaware as the
forum. A key danger to lawyer-driven suits is the risk of a courtsanctioned resolution that provides the defendant with a broadly-worded
release encompassing claims that could have substantial merit but have
not yet been sufficiently investigated. From the defendant’s perspective,
the value of such a settlement may far off-set any perceived transaction
tax—indeed, the settlement is sometimes characterized as an insurance
policy against future claims where the attorney’s fees paid to plaintiff’s
lawyer are the insurance premium.177 To the shareholder, such settlements
are a triple whammy: like other forms of insurance, they undermine
incentives to comply with the law; unlike other forms of insurance, the
potential shareholder-victims do not receive any insurance payout; and the
attorney’s fees/insurance premium is priced into the deal term and thus
comes at the expense of shareholders.
Corporate forum-terms that locate litigation in Delaware indirectly deal
with the problem of settlements of this sort. The reason stems from the

177. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1057–58 (2013).
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approach of the Delaware Chancery Court to settlements, set out in
Chancellor Bouchard’s decision in In re Trulia.178 In re Trulia concerned
a proposed settlement of a shareholder class action challenging a merger.
Shortly after the transaction was announced, several groups of
shareholders brought separate lawsuits; after limited discovery, the suits
settled within four months of filing. The settlement was “disclosure-only:”
Trulia agreed to provide shareholders with supplementary disclosure
about the merger, but shareholders received no other recovery. In return,
plaintiffs dropped their motion for a preliminary injunction and agreed to
provide a broad release including any claims “relating in any conceivable
way” to the merger. In addition, defendants agreed not to oppose payment
of attorney’s fees of $375,000.179
Although no shareholder objected to the proposed settlement,180 the
Chancery Court rejected it—finding that the additional disclosures were
neither material nor “even helpful” to Trulia’s shareholders.181 The court
noted the problems with merger-related suits that we discussed above:
almost every merger involving a public corporation engenders a “flurry of
class action lawsuits,” many of which lack merit;182 these suits
nevertheless result in fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers who settle quickly on
terms that offer no monetary benefit to the stockholders they represent,
usually involving supplemental disclosures of questionable value;183
defendants readily agree to provide such disclosures and advocate the
178. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
179. Id. at 889.
180. At a hearing on the fairness of the settlement, the court asked the parties for supplemental
briefing on the benefits of disclosure and the rationale for the scope of the release. In response, an
amicus curiae brief was filed by Professor Sean Griffith and the scope of the release was narrowed.
See Brief of Sean J. Griffith as Amicus Curiae, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2015) (No. 10020-CB), 2015 WL 6391945.
181. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 908–09.
182. Id. at 891, 894 (citing MATTHEW D. CAIN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, TAKEOVER
LITIGATION IN 2015, at 2 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/6XW9-5RK3])
(in 2014, 94.4% and in 2015, 87.7% of transactions involving more than $100 million triggered
litigation and in 2012, 76.0% of such litigation in Delaware was settled for solely supplemental
disclosures); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) (contending that litigation
challenging mergers is ubiquitous, results in no meaningful recovery, but mostly benefits lawyers
who earn fees); Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring
Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 491, 534 (2016) (arguing that a settlement that provides only immaterial supplemental
disclosures is a good proxy for a weak claim).
183. See Cain & Solomon, supra note 172, at 478 (showing that 316 of 411 non-dismissed cases
involved a settlement for disclosures only and that meant fee award in these cases was $749,000,
whereas only 28 cases involved increased consideration).
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approval of the settlement which also includes broad releases and
attorney’s fees.184
To deal with these problems, the court alerted practitioners to expect in
future cases:
that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address
a plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject
matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to
encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary
duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that
such claims have been investigated sufficiently. In using the term
“plainly material,” I mean that it should not be a close call that
the supplemental information is material as that term is defined
under Delaware law. Where the supplemental information is not
plainly material, it may be appropriate for the Court to appoint an
amicus curiae to assist the Court in its evaluation of the alleged
benefits of the supplemental disclosures, given the challenges
posed by the non-adversarial nature of the typical disclosure
settlement hearing.
Finally, some have expressed concern that enhanced judicial
scrutiny of disclosure settlements could lead plaintiffs to sue
fiduciaries of Delaware corporations in other jurisdictions in the
hope of finding a forum more hospitable to signing off on
settlements of no genuine value. It is within the power of a
Delaware corporation to enact a forum selection bylaw to address
this concern.185
In re Trulia represents the culmination of several earlier Delaware
decisions expressing increasing concern about settlement of merger
litigation. During 2015, three other members of the five-judge Chancery
Court had criticized these settlements and subjected to increasing scrutiny
of the “give” (the value of the disclosures) and the “get” (broad releases
including potential claims without investigation) in assessing their

184. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 895 (citing Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposes the
Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements (U. Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for L. and Econ. Res. Paper No. 1540, Draft Dec. 17, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2689877 [https://perma.cc/3L63-A7ET]) (noting
that in the recent Rural Metro litigation, the court “initially considered it a ‘very close call’” to reject
a disclosure settlement that would have released claims that, after a new counsel took over, yielded a
damage award of more than $100 million (Transcript at 134, In re Rural/Metro Corp. S’holders Litig.,
102 A.3d 205 (Del. Ch. 2014) (No. 6350-VCL)).
185. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898–99.
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fairness.186 While seeking to control merger litigation resulting in broad
releases, disclosure-only remedies, and attorney’s fees, the Chancery
Court nevertheless remains an attractive forum for suits that generate large
monetary recoveries for shareholders—and correspondingly high fees for
plaintiffs’ attorneys.187
As Chancellor Bouchard noted, charter and bylaw forum-terms play an
important function in the enforcement of this judicial “policy” against
strike suits and overbroad releases.188 To the extent that courts in other
states continue to approve disclosure-only settlements, award attorney’s
fees, and approve broad releases, Delaware’s approach will be
undermined. There are thus strong reasons for localizing deal-litigation in
Delaware courts to enable the state to regulate merger activity of Delaware
companies; to avoid the imposition of a transaction tax on shareholders;
and to withhold “deal insurance” that insulate Delaware companies from
liability for wrongdoing that the court would redress. In this situation,
enforcement of a corporate forum-term by a non-selected forum in favor
of Delaware serves the private interests of the shareholders.
Enforcement of the forum-term thus would serve at least three
important public interests. First, by centralizing the litigation in Delaware,
use of the forum-term arguably encourages sound corporate governance.
Second, it encourages the effective use of judicial resources by obviating
or reducing the likelihood of competing lawsuits and the costs that
accompany strike suits. Third, it promotes law development by permitting
Delaware to interpret its corporate law in the context of the state’s broader
regulatory regime.
186. See Transcript of Settlement Hr’g and Req. for Att’ys’ Fees and the Ct.’s Rulings at 74,
Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL, 2015 WL 4127547 (Del. Ch. Jul. 8, 2015)
(Laster, V.C.) (refusing to approve settlement); Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hr’g at 17–
18, In re Intermune, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2015) (Noble, V.C.);
Mem. Op. at 11–15, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041
(Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (Glasscock, V.C.). According to some reports, even these pre-Trulia
decisions resulted in a significant decline in merger litigation. See Daniel W. Halston & Alexandra C.
Boudreau, After In re Trulia: Increased Scrutiny for the Give and the Get in Disclosure Settlements,
WILMERHALE: PUBLICATIONS AND NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/
publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179880878 [https://perma.cc/A7LL-TEFG].
187. See, e.g., In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 819 (Del. Ch.
2011) ($300 million fee award); Gina Chon & Joe Palazzolo, An Early Christmas for These Lawyers:
$300 Million in Fees for Shareholder Case Sets Off Debate, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204296804577124772580624142. See generally
David Marcus, Delaware’s Chancery Grapples with Multijurisdictional Litigation, DAILY DEAL,
Dec. 9, 2011, 2011 WLNR 26934635; Cain & Solomon, supra note 172, at 469 (finding that Delaware
awards higher attorney’s fees but dismisses a greater proportion of cases than other states).
188. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (noting that companies can adopt charter or bylaw forum terms
to address concern of suits filed in jurisdictions “more hospitable to signing off on settlements of no
genuine value”).
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The Special Problem of Waiver and Representative Litigation

We consider one additional question that generally presents no issues
in the context of ordinary contractual forum-selection provisions: whether
the corporation should be permitted to waive the clause in favor of a nonselected forum. In our discussion of “Trulia”-forum-terms, we assumed
that the corporation would seek to enforce the provision. However, most
actual provisions permit the company to waive the clause and the
company may want to do so.
In our view, waivers may in some circumstances be beneficial. This
may occur, for example, when the selected forum cannot efficiently
dispose of the litigation because of a lack of jurisdiction. However, a
corporate board sometimes may elect to waive a forum-term for selfinterested reasons, rather than for convenience or interests of justice,
necessitating close scrutiny of a waiver.
Although parallel litigation often is described as a costly scourge for
defendants, defendants may benefit strategically—in ways that are not
beneficial to shareholders—when parallel representative suits are filed.
This structural problem stems from the requirements of Full Faith and
Credit: the first case to come to judgment will have preclusive effect on
any subsequent claims. As a result, the plaintiffs’ law firm that concludes
the first lawsuit is the firm most likely to receive legal fees as part of the
judgment. The ensuing competition among plaintiffs’ law firms can
motivate a “race to settle” that may be won by the firm willing to settle on
the cheapest terms.189 The need for speed also reduces incentives to
investigate claims to determine their actual strength, to the detriment of
the shareholders.190
The ability of the corporation to waive charter or bylaw forum-terms
provides no protection for shareholders from these competitive dynamics.
Knowing that a forum-term can be waived incentivizes plaintiffs’ counsel
189. Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions:
A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998); Arthur R. Miller & David
Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910 (1987)
(noting that “separate actions induce a rush to judgment”); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 462.
190. Thomas, supra note 57, at 1946–47; Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder
Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 505–07. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 789 (3d Cir. 1995) (“With early settlement, both parties have
less information on the merits. . . . Without the benefit of more extensive discovery, both sides may
underestimate the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims.”); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 474–75 (noting
that pressure to settle results in plaintiffs’ lawyers commencing settlement negotiations before they
have undertaken substantial discovery).
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to file suit in a non-selected forum that is less than robust in its scrutiny
of settlements and to offer terms that are attractive to the company by
giving it an insurance policy against future claims, but that are not
beneficial to the shareholders.191
Whether a waiver is proper thus depends on the particular
circumstances. Assume a situation in which multiple suits are pending,
including a suit in the selected forum. If defendant seeks to waive the
selected forum, and plaintiffs object, one might suspect that the waiver is
the product of a “race to settle.” But even if only a single suit is filed, or
if the plaintiff who filed a parallel suit in the selected forum does not
object to the waiver, a waiver can undermine Delaware’s judicial policy
against disclosure-only settlements and low-recovery settlements with
broad releases.
To address this potential for abuse, in our view, judges in the nonselected forum have a special duty to monitor their role in any proposed
settlements. Because the company has adopted a forum-term and has a
plausible argument for dismissal of the lawsuit in the non-selected forum,
the company’s decision to pursue settlement with a lawyer in the nonselected forum raises at least a yellow flag. The judge presiding over a
suit in a non-selected forum generally ought to give particular attention to
objections to a proposed settlement when it is accompanied by waiver of
a forum-term and a competing action is pending in the selected forum. In
such a situation, the waiver may serve as a signal for an unfair settlement
or, at the least, that the claims have not been sufficiently investigated to
justify preclusion.
Judges in the selected forum also can monitor decisions to waive a
forum-term. When multiple actions are pending, objectors who have filed
suit in the selected forum may seek an injunction against the companydefendant from waiving the forum-term or agreeing to a settlement in a
case pending in a non-selected forum.192 Generally, principles of
191. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal
Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t 11 (Fordham U. Sch. of Law, Legal Stud. Res. Paper No.
2855950, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950 [https://perma.cc/V52D-J3N3], to be included in
THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas,
eds., forthcoming 2018) (arguing that corporate defendants often do not want to invoke exclusive
forum-terms in order to pursue disclosure-only settlements that would not be approved in Delaware
under Trulia).
192. See Wasserman, supra note 169, at 511 (“A court entertaining a class action may, in some
circumstances, enjoin the parties from initiating additional suits or prosecuting dueling actions
previously filed.”). To be sure, an injunction may not be able to bind absent class members and the
alternate forum court may not enforce it and proceed with the litigation. See Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antitrust Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1148 (1998); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 511–12, 518. But the selected forum court’s ability to
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federalism and comity have made courts reluctant to enjoin proceedings
in other courts,193 and a state court lacks authority to enjoin a federal
proceeding.194 So far, Delaware courts have not had occasion to enforce
forum-terms aggressively in this manner. But litigation subject to
corporate forum-terms is still in its infancy, and—as we have argued—
the factors for and against their enforcement differ from the run-of-themine contractual forum-selection provision. Even if a court in the selected
forum would be reluctant to issue an injunction, the court could make a
strong appeal to the court in the alternate forum state requesting that that
court not approve any settlement. Although there is no formal mechanism
for coordinating inter-state judicial relations, informal mechanisms have
developed in other contexts in which Delaware has participated.195
In addition, the corporation’s decision to waive a forum-term could be
monitored as a breach of fiduciary duty by the board members who have
approved the waiver. To be sure, such a claim would generally require a
showing that a majority of the directors had a material conflict of interest

hold the defendant in contempt provides significant incentives to the defendant to comply. See Polly
J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 791 (1998) (noting that,
unlike individual defendants, multi-state corporations cannot simply absent themselves from the
forum that issued the injunction and thereby render enforcement difficult).
193. See State ex rel. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo. 1978) (stating that
“the power of one State’s court of equity to restrain persons within control of its process from the
prosecution of suits in another State is clear, but on comity considerations, it should be employed with
great caution”).
194. 21 C.J.S. COURTS § 227 (1990) (stating that “[A] court which has acquired jurisdiction of the
parties has power . . . to enjoin them from proceeding with an action in a court of another state . . .
with respect to a controversy between the same parties of which it obtained jurisdiction prior to the
foreign court. This power of a court should be exercised sparingly.”) (footnotes omitted); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 523 (1996) (explaining that courts are
usually sensitive to interstate comity and usually require a convincing reason for an injunction);
Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and Preclusion: Complementary
Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REV. 925, 927–28 (noting the “comity
barriers” to interstate injunctions); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 512. On the lack of state authority
to enjoin a federal proceeding, see, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 21 n.24 (1983) (explaining that the Court does not suggest that a state court’s injunction could
have prevented the petitioner from instituting the federal action); Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S.
12, 12 (1977) (holding that “it is not within the power of state courts to bar litigants from filing and
prosecuting in personam actions in the federal courts”); id. at 17 (stating that “the rights conferred by
Congress to bring in personam actions in federal courts are not subject to abridgment by state-court
injunctions, regardless of whether the federal litigation is pending or prospective”); Donovan v. City
of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) (stating that “state courts are completely without power to restrain
federal court proceedings in in personam actions”).
195. See Randall S. Thomas, 19th Annual Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference: The
Economics of Aggregate Litigation: What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation in M&A
Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2013) (discussing the need for “greater coordination among
judges in different courts”).
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in granting the waiver or lacked independence.196 But in a proper case,
such a showing could be made. In particular, because the Delaware
judiciary has identified certain forms of settlements as raising serious
concerns, it may view skeptically a board decision to waive Delaware as
a selected forum in order to join such a settlement.
Finally, a lawyer advising a Delaware company would likely tell the
board to think twice before waiving a forum-term that selects Delaware in
order to enter into a settlement of the sort condemned in Trulia—low
recovery, high fee, broad release, and minimal pre-filing investigation. A
company that has not adopted a forum-term favoring Delaware could
plausibly argue that such a settlement benefits the shareholders by
disposing of litigation that otherwise would consume corporate resources
and threaten a proposed merger—thus justifying expedition and attorney’s
fees despite a low recovery for the shareholders. Paradoxically, a
company in this position could plausibly argue further that a broad release
will facilitate consummation of the acquisition, which otherwise might be
stalled by sequential suits by the same or a different set of plaintiffs’
lawyers.
But these arguments are not available to a Delaware company that has
adopted a forum-term in favor of Delaware. Such a company, when sued,
could expect dismissal without payment of attorneys’ fees—that is the
point of the Delaware court’s approach in Trulia. Thus, a defendant does
not need to take any additional steps to avoid delaying consummation of
the deal. If, however, that company seeks to settle in an alternative forum
and to waive the forum-term, one may suspect that the defendant’s desire
for a broad release may stem from concerns that a more diligent
investigation by a different set of lawyers will uncover more serious
claims. Even if the Delaware courts are not receptive to enjoining the
waiver or the settlement, or to seeing the waiver as a breach of fiduciary
duty, defendant’s counsel, as officers of the court, may be reluctant to
injure their reputational interests by taking a course that runs counter to
Delaware’s Trulia policy. Thus, as long as the Delaware courts are willing
to monitor waivers, the forum-term for a Delaware company may be
difficult to waive in a context involving parallel lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
So far we have considered the import of corporate forum-terms for
adjudicative practice and argued that the justification for their use cannot
rest only upon litigant consent. We conclude by considering the

196. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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implications of exclusive corporate forum-terms for state competition for
attracting incorporations—a question completely obscured by the
contractual approach.
The literature about state competition for incorporation inevitably
points to the quality of the Delaware judiciary as a magnet for a
company’s decision to locate in that state.197 This preference is distinct
from the benefit of having Delaware law govern in a dispute involving the
corporation. From this perspective, a policy authorizing a corporation to
adopt a forum-term designating Delaware courts as exclusive fora through
a charter or bylaw provision makes it more likely that companies that
incorporate in Delaware will get the benefit that they seek—claims
involving the firm will be adjudicated in Delaware.198 As such, it increases
Delaware’s competitive edge by bolstering its attraction as a state of
incorporation.199 Similarly, to the extent that the Delaware court’s
“Trulia” approach to settlement is seen as value enhancing, then an
exclusive forum-term that locks in that approach for a Delaware
corporation likewise bolsters Delaware as a site of incorporation.
Maintaining a steady flow of corporation cases into Delaware benefits
the state in another way, too. In addition to the quality of its judiciary,
incorporation decisions also take account of Delaware’s extensive
decisional law on corporate matters. By having disputes adjudicated in its
own courts, Delaware can more easily control doctrinal development by
resolving legal ambiguity and increasing the body of precedent than it

197. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1995) (noting the quality of Delaware
courts); Klausner, supra note 143, at 845 (same); Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 125, at 277
(same).
198. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW.
U. L. REV. 542, 589–90 (1990) (arguing that quality of state courts is one reason why corporations
incorporate in Delaware); Romano, supra note 125, at 276–77 (same).
199. In some cases, a certification process can facilitate a court’s correct application of another
state’s law (a presumable goal of an exclusive forum provision selecting the state of incorporation’s
courts). Indeed, Delaware makes certification available in a number of unusual contexts, such as
certification of questions by federal agencies and by bankruptcy courts. See Verity Winship,
Delaware Invites Certified Questions from Bankruptcy Courts, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 427 (2014); Verity
Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State-Law Questions by Federal
Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181 (2010). But certification has several shortcomings. A court from
another forum hearing an intra-corporate dispute of a Delaware firm is not required to seek guidance
from the Delaware high court; the answering of a certified question differs from deciding a case on a
full factual record as a certified question typically is framed as a question of law, and not as the
application of law to facts; and a principal attraction is Delaware’s trial court, which would not be
involved in any certification.
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could by sharing interpretative authority with other state courts.200
Exclusive forum-terms in the charter and bylaws of Delaware
corporations selecting the Delaware Chancery Court as forum thus
enhance Delaware’s position in the market for incorporations, and
Delaware case and statutory law validating such provisions could be seen
as state actions designed to make Delaware more attractive as domicile.
Any measure that enhances the attractiveness of Delaware as a
domicile makes it harder for other states to compete with Delaware.
Delaware could not directly oust other states of hearing disputes
concerning Delaware corporations and decided under Delaware law. With
respect to forum-terms, the state can achieve this goal indirectly through
the mechanism of private ordering.201
In addition to competition for incorporations, forum-terms affect
competition for corporate litigation. Because lawsuits can be filed in states
other than the state of incorporation, competition for corporate litigation
is distinct from competition for incorporations. Indeed, attracting
incorporations and attracting litigation benefits different constituents. In
the case of Delaware, the principal direct beneficiary of attracting
incorporations is the fisc: Delaware obtains hundreds of millions of
dollars, amounting to one-third of its total revenues, from corporate
franchise taxes. Most other states, by contrast, would obtain only trivial
additional revenues by attracting incorporations.202
The principal direct beneficiary of attracting corporate litigation, for
any state, is the local bar, whose members are likely to represent the
plaintiffs and defendants in such suits. States would benefit only indirectly

200. In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 959 (Del. Ch. 2007) (emphasizing the
“coherence-generating benefits created” when a state court enforces its own laws and calling this a
“compelling public policy interest in deciding these disputes”). See also Klausner, supra note 143, at
775–79 (noting externalities created by large body of corporate law precedents). Moreover, the
Delaware judiciary arguably can retain expertise by resolving a steady stream of corporate disputes.
Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1908, 1925–27 (1998).
201. Moreover, exclusive forum-terms may hamper other states in a particular way that goes
beyond merely making Delaware more attractive. Because only a small number of publicly traded
companies choose to incorporate in any state other than Delaware, any state that wants to enhance its
market position by developing judicial expertise must find a source of corporate disputes for its courts
to decide. Attracting disputes involving corporations incorporated in other states would ameliorate
this difficulty. A corporate forum-term selecting Delaware as an exclusive forum reduces this
potential. Exclusive forum-terms favoring Delaware thus not only make Delaware more attractive,
but also make it harder for other states to compete with Delaware.
202. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1219–25 (2001).
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from taxing the income of local lawyers and may incur costs in providing
adjudicatory services.203
Several states, including Delaware, have adopted legislation that
permits firms incorporated in the state to adopt forum-terms designating
local courts as exclusive fora for certain disputes, but invalidates forumterms that designate the courts of another state as exclusive fora.
According to a member of the Council of the Corporation Law Section of
the Delaware State Bar Association involved in the drafting of Delaware’s
forum-term legislation,204 one motivation for this legislation was to
prevent companies, especially those with a controlling shareholder, to
select an exclusive forum with controller-friendly procedural rules.205 But
by adopting legislation that bars corporations from selecting the courts of,
say, its headquarter state or of the state where most production facilities
are located as exclusive fora (unless they are also incorporated in the
state), legislatures departed from the enabling approach of its corporate
law—an approach that provides the conceptual foundation for a
corporation’s adoption of a forum-term and its enforceability by sister
courts.206
203. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1586
(2002) (arguing that the self-interest of lawyers outside of Delaware in maintaining litigation business
induces them to advise clients to incorporate in their headquarter state).
204. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 851, 858 n.47 (2016) (citing Francis G.X. Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and
Forum Selection Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COMMERCIAL LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www.eckertseamans.com/app/uploads/Pileggi-Westlaw-Journal-Delaware-Corporate03.20.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP2C-8YJ3]) (describing 2015 changes proposed by Delaware Bar’s
Corporate Law Council prior to enactment of Section 115). See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political
Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103,
1147 (2002) (noting a “strong legislative norm in Delaware in favor of deference to the Corporate
Law Section of the Bar Association”).
205. Cf. City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, 99 A.3d 229, 230–31 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(decided shortly before the legislation was adopted, upholding the ability to select the courts of other
states as exclusive fora in a case where the controlling shareholder of a North Carolina headquartered
company selected courts in North Carolina). North Carolina permits an award of attorneys’ fees to
class action lawyers only under the “common fund” doctrine, where the litigation results in a monetary
award to the class members, or if they are paid pursuant to a settlement agreement. See Mark Hiller,
NC Court of Appeals Approves Payments of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Action Settlements, ROBINSON
BRADSHAW: CAROLINAS CLASS ACTION (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.carolinasclassaction.com
/index.php/2015/09/nc-court-of-appeals-approves-payments-of-attorneys-fees-in-class-actionsettlements/ [https://perma.cc/N4T5-N47Y].
206. While recognizing that the proposal came at the cost of litigant autonomy, and that it deviated
from the enabling model of Delaware law, the Council nevertheless defended the bill as essential to
maintain Delaware as the forum for corporate-law disputes:
The Council believes that stockholders of Delaware corporations should not be denied access to
the protection of the Delaware courts. Thus, the broadly enabling nature of the DGCL would be
trimmed back to address this issue. In particular, the Council believes that the value of Delaware
as a favored jurisdiction of incorporation is dependent on a consistent development of a balance
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We are not in a position to determine the reasons that led various states
to adopt such forum-term legislation. Delaware’s main goal may have
been protecting minority shareholders or enhancing its attractiveness as
domicile to obtain higher franchise tax revenues and perhaps other states
may have just copied Delaware’s approach. But given the self-interest of
the local lawyers who often play a major role in the drafting of such
legislation, it is plausible that some states sought to further the interest of
the local bar in attracting litigation to local courts. Promoting private
interests in this way cuts deeply into principles of judicial federalism,
raising concerns under the Commerce Clause and the norm of state
equality. To that extent, the adoption of legislation that on its face
discriminates in favor of in-state courts may provide grounds for sister
states to refuse to enforce forum-terms that were adopted after such
legislation was enacted.

of corporate law, and that the Delaware courts are best situated to continue to oversee that
development.
Q&A Accompanying Draft Legislation Banning Fee-Shifting Bylaws 4, Prepared by the Corporation
Law Council, Delaware State Bar Association, 2015, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporategovernance/legislation/delaware-stat-revisions/Council-Second-Proposal-FAQs-3-6-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HUE8-VGKK].

